Archive for Likelihood Principle

Deborah Mayo’s talk in Montréal (JSM 2013)

Posted in Books, Statistics, Uncategorized with tags , , , , , , on July 31, 2013 by xi'an

As posted on her blog, Deborah Mayo is giving a lecture at JSM 2013 in Montréal about why Birnbaum’s derivation of the Strong Likelihood Principle (SLP) is wrong. Or, more accurately, why “WCP entails SLP”. It would have been a great opportunity to hear Deborah presenting her case and I am sorry I am missing this opportunity. (Although not sorry to be in the beautiful Dolomites at that time.) Here are the slides:

Deborah’s argument is the same as previously: there is no reason for the inference in the mixed (or Birnbaumized) experiment to be equal to the inference in the conditional experiment. As previously, I do not get it: the weak conditionality principle (WCP) implies that inference from the mixture output, once we know which component is used (hence rejecting the “and we don’t know which” on slide 8), should only be dependent on that component. I also fail to understand why either WCP or the Birnbaum experiment refers to a mixture (sl.13) in that the index of the experiment is assumed to be known, contrary to mixtures. Thus (still referring at slide 13), the presentation of Birnbaum’s experiment is erroneous. It is indeed impossible to force the outcome of y* if tail and of x* if head but it is possible to choose the experiment index at random, 1 versus 2, and then, if y* is observed, to report (E1,x*) as a sufficient statistic. (Incidentally, there is a typo on slide 15, it should be “likewise for x*”.)

Birnbaum’s proof missing one bar?!

Posted in Statistics with tags , , , , on March 4, 2013 by xi'an

Michael Evans just posted a new paper on arXiv yesterday about Birnbaum’s proof of his likelihood principle theorem. There has recently been a lot of activity around this theorem (some of which reported on the ‘Og!) and the flurry of proofs, disproofs, arguments, counterarguments, and counter-counterarguments, mostly by major figures in the field, is rather overwhelming! This paper  is however highly readable as it sets everything in terms of set theory and relations. While I am not completely convinced that the conclusion holds, the steps in the paper seem correct. The starting point is that the likelihood relation, L, the invariance relation, G, and the sufficiency relation, S, all are equivalence relations (on the set of inference bases/parametric families). The conditionality relation,C, however fails to be transitive and hence an equivalence relation. Furthermore, the smallest equivalence relation containing the conditionality relation is the likelihood relation. Then Evans proves that the conjunction of the sufficiency and the conditionality relations is strictly included in the likelihood relation, which is the smallest equivalence relation containing the union. Furthermore, the fact that the smallest equivalence relation containing the conditionality relation is the likelihood relation means that sufficiency is irrelevant (in this sense, and in this sense only!).

This is a highly interesting and well-written document. I just do not know what to think of it in correspondence with my understanding of the likelihood principle. That

\overline{S \cup C} = L

rather than

S \cup C =L

makes a difference from a mathematical point of view, however I cannot relate it to the statistical interpretation. Like, why would we have to insist upon equivalence? why does invariance appear in some lemmas? why is a maximal ancillary statistics relevant at this stage when it does not appear in the original proof of Birbaum (1962)? why is there no mention made of weak versus strong conditionality principle?

about randomness (im Hamburg)

Posted in Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , on February 20, 2013 by xi'an

exhibit in DESY campus, Hamburg, Germany, Feb. 19, 2013True randomness was the topic of the `Random numbers; fifty years later’ talk in DESY by Frederick James from CERN. I had discussed a while ago a puzzling book related to this topic. This talk went along a rather different route, focussing on random generators. James put this claim that there are computer based physical generators that are truly random. (He had this assertion that statisticians do not understand randomness because they do not know quantum mechanics.) He distinguished those from pseudo-random generators: “nobody understood why they were (almost) random”, “IBM did not know how to generate random numbers”… But then spent the whole talk discussing those pseudo-random generators. Among other pieces of trivia, James mentioned that George Marsaglia was the one exhibiting the hyperplane features of congruential generators. That Knuth achieved no successful definition of what randomness is in his otherwise wonderful books! James thus introduced Kolmogorov’s mixing (not Kolmogorov’s complexity, mind you!) as advocated by Soviet physicists to underlie randomness. Not producing anything useful for RNGs in the 60’s. He then moved to the famous paper by Ferrenberg, Landau and Wong (1992) that I remember reading more or less at the time. In connection with the phase transition critical slowing down phenomena in Ising model simulations. And connecting with the Wang-Landau algorithm of flipping many sites at once (which exhibited long-term dependences in the generators). Most interestingly, a central character in this story is Martin Lüscher, based in DESY, who expressed the standard generator of the time RCARRY into one studied by those Soviet mathematicians,


showing that it enjoyed Kolmogorov mixing, but with a very poor Lyapunov coefficient. I partly lost track there as RCARRY was not perfect. And on how this Kolmogorov mixing would relate to long-term dependencies. One explanation by James was that this property is only asymptotic. (I would even say statistical!) Also interestingly, the 1994 paper by Lüscher produces the number of steps necessary to attain complete mixing, namely 15 steps, which thus works as a cutoff point. (I wonder why a 15-step RCARRY is slower, since A15 can be computed at once… It may be due to the fact that A is sparse while A15 is not.) James mentioned that Marsaglia’s Die Hard battery of tests is now obsolete and superseded by Pierre Lecuyer’s TestU01.

In conclusion, I did very much like this presentation from an insider, but still do not feel it makes a contribution to the debate on randomness, as it stayed put on pseudorandom generators. To keep the connection with von Neumann, they all produce wrong answers from a randomness point of view, if not from a statistical one. (A final quote from the talk: “Among statisticians and number theorists who are supposed to be specialists, they do not know about Kolmogorov mixing.”) [Discussing with Fred James at the reception after the talk was obviously extremely pleasant, as he happened to know a lot of my Bayesian acquaintances!]

paradoxes in scientific inference: a reply from the author

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , on December 26, 2012 by xi'an

(I received the following set of comments from Mark Chang after publishing a review of his book on the ‘Og. Here they are, verbatim, except for a few editing and spelling changes. It’s a huge post as Chang reproduces all of my comments as well.)

Professor Christian Robert reviewed my book: “Paradoxes in Scientific Inference”. I found that the majority of his criticisms had no foundation and were based on his truncated way of reading. I gave point-by-point responses below. For clarity, I kept his original comments.

Robert’s Comments: This CRC Press book was sent to me for review in CHANCE: Paradoxes in Scientific Inference is written by Mark Chang, vice-president of AMAG Pharmaceuticals. The topic of scientific paradoxes is one of my primary interests and I have learned a lot by looking at Lindley-Jeffreys and Savage-Dickey paradoxes. However, I did not find a renewed sense of excitement when reading the book. The very first (and maybe the best!) paradox with Paradoxes in Scientific Inference is that it is a book from the future! Indeed, its copyright year is 2013 (!), although I got it a few months ago. (Not mentioning here the cover mimicking Escher’s “paradoxical” pictures with dices. A sculpture due to Shigeo Fukuda and apparently not quoted in the book. As I do not want to get into another dice cover polemic, I will abstain from further comments!)

Thank you, Robert for reading and commenting on part of my book. I had the same question on the copyright year being 2013 when it was actually published in previous year. I believe the same thing had happened to my other books too. The incorrect year causes confusion for future citations. The cover was designed by the publisher. They gave me few options and I picked the one with dices. I was told that the publisher has the copyright for the art work. I am not aware of the original artist. Continue reading

paradoxes in scientific inference

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , on November 23, 2012 by xi'an

This CRC Press book was sent to me for review in CHANCE: Paradoxes in Scientific Inference is written by Mark Chang, vice-president of AMAG Pharmaceuticals. The topic of scientific paradoxes is one of my primary interests and I have learned a lot by looking at Lindley-Jeffreys and Savage-Dickey paradoxes. However, I did not find a renewed sense of excitement when reading the book. The very first (and maybe the best!) paradox with Paradoxes in Scientific Inference is that it is a book from the future! Indeed, its copyright year is 2013 (!), although I got it a few months ago. (Not mentioning here the cover mimicking Escher’s “paradoxical” pictures with dices. A sculpture due to Shigeo Fukuda and apparently not quoted in the book. As I do not want to get into another dice cover polemic, I will abstain from further comments!)

Now, getting into a deeper level of criticism (!), I find the book very uneven and overall quite disappointing. (Even missing in its statistical foundations.) Esp. given my initial level of excitement about the topic!

First, there is a tendency to turn everything into a paradox: obviously, when writing a book about paradoxes, everything looks like a paradox! This means bringing into the picture every paradox known to man and then some, i.e., things that are either un-paradoxical (e.g., Gödel’s incompleteness result) or uninteresting in a scientific book (e.g., the birthday paradox, which may be surprising but is far from a paradox!). Fermat’s theorem is also quoted as a paradox, even though there is nothing in the text indicating in which sense it is a paradox. (Or is it because it is simple to express, hard to prove?!) Similarly, Brownian motion is considered a paradox, as “reconcil[ing] the paradox between two of the greatest theories of physics (…): thermodynamics and the kinetic theory of gases” (p.51) For instance, the author considers the MLE being biased to be a paradox (p.117), while omitting the much more substantial “paradox” of the non-existence of unbiased estimators of most parameters—which simply means unbiasedness is irrelevant. Or the other even more puzzling “paradox” that the secondary MLE derived from the likelihood associated with the distribution of a primary MLE may differ from the primary. (My favourite!)

When the null hypothesis is rejected, the p-value is the probability of the type I error.Paradoxes in Scientific Inference (p.105)

The p-value is the conditional probability given H0.” Paradoxes in Scientific Inference (p.106)

Second, the depth of the statistical analysis in the book is often found missing. For instance, Simpson’s paradox is not analysed from a statistical perspective, only reported as a fact. Sticking to statistics, take for instance the discussion of Lindley’s paradox. The author seems to think that the problem is with the different conclusions produced by the frequentist, likelihood, and Bayesian analyses (p.122). This is completely wrong: Lindley’s (or Lindley-Jeffreys‘s) paradox is about the lack of significance of Bayes factors based on improper priors. Similarly, when the likelihood ratio test is introduced, the reference threshold is given as equal to 1 and no mention is later made of compensating for different degrees of freedom/against over-fitting. The discussion about p-values is equally garbled, witness the above quote which (a) conditions upon the rejection and (b) ignores the dependence of the p-value on a realized random variable. Continue reading

Error and Inference [on wrong models]

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , on December 6, 2011 by xi'an

In connection with my series of posts on the book Error and Inference, and my recent collation of those into an arXiv document, Deborah Mayo has started a series of informal seminars at the LSE on the philosophy of errors in statistics and the likelihood principle. and has also posted a long comment on my argument about only using wrong models. (The title is inspired from the Rolling Stones’ “You can’t always get what you want“, very cool!) The discussion about the need or not to take into account all possible models (which is the meaning of the “catchall hypothesis” I had missed while reading the book) shows my point was not clear. I obviously do not claim in the review that all possible models should be accounted for at once, this was on the opposite my understanding of Mayo’s criticism of the Bayesian approach (I thought the following sentence was clear enough: “According to Mayo, this alternative hypothesis should “include all possible rivals, including those not even though of” (p.37)”)! So I see the Bayesian approach as a way to put on the table a collection of reasonable (if all wrong) models and give to those models a posterior probability, with the purpose that improbable ones are eliminated. Therefore, I am in agreement with most of the comments in the post, esp. because this has little to do with Bayesian versus frequentist testing! Even rejecting the less likely models from a collection seems compatible with a Bayesian approach, model averaging is not always an appropriate solution, depending on the loss function!

Error and Inference [end]

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , on October 11, 2011 by xi'an

(This is my sixth and last post on Error and Inference, being as previously a raw and naïve reaction born from a linear and sluggish reading of the book, rather than a deeper and more informed criticism with philosophical bearings. Read at your own risk.)

‘It is refreshing to see Cox and Mayo give a hard-nosed statement of what scientific objectivity demands of an account of statistics, show how it relates to frequentist statistics, and contrast that with the notion of “objectivity” used by O-Bayesians.”—A. Spanos, p.326, Error and Inference, 2010

In order to conclude my pedestrian traverse of Error and Inference, I read the discussion by Aris Spanos of the second part of the seventh chapter by David Cox’s and Deborah Mayo’s, discussed in the previous post. (In the train to the half-marathon to be precise, which may have added a sharper edge to the way I read it!) The first point in the discussion is that the above paper is “a harmonious blend of the Fisherian and N-P perspectives to weave a coherent frequentist inductive reasoning anchored firmly on error probabilities”(p.316). The discussion by Spanos is very much a-critical of the paper, so I will not engage into a criticism of the non-criticism, but rather expose some thoughts of mine that came from reading this apology. (Remarks about Bayesian inference are limited to some piques like the above, which only reiterates those found earlier [and later: "the various examples Bayesians employ to make their case involve some kind of "rigging" of the statistical model", Aris Spanos, p.325; "The Bayesian epistemology literature is filled with shadows and illusions", Clark Glymour, p. 335] in the book.) [I must add I do like the mention of O-Bayesians, as I coined the O'Bayes motto for the objective Bayes bi-annual meetings from 2003 onwards! It also reminds me of the O-rings and of the lack of proper statistical decision-making in the Challenger tragedy...]

The “general frequentist principle for inductive reasoning” (p.319) at the core of Cox and Mayo’s paper is obviously the central role of the p-value in “providing (strong) evidence against the null H0 (for a discrepancy from H0)”. Once again, I fail to see it as the epitome of a working principle in that

  1. it depends on the choice of a divergence d(z), which reduces the information brought by the data z;
  2. it does not articulate the level for labeling nor the consequences of finding a low p-value;
  3. it ignores the role of the alternative hypothesis.

Furthermore, Spanos’ discussion deals with “the fallacy of rejection” (pp.319-320) in a rather artificial (if common) way, namely by setting a buffer of discrepancy γ around the null hypothesis. While the choice of a maximal degree of precision sounds natural to me (in the sense that a given sample size should not allow for the discrimination between two arbitrary close values of the parameter), the fact that γ is in fine set by the data (so that the p-value is high) is fairly puzzling. If I understand correctly, the change from a p-value to a discrepancy γ is a fine device to make the “distance” from the null better understood, but it has an extremely limited range of application. If I do not understand correctly, the discrepancy γ is fixed by the statistician and then this sounds like an extreme form of prior selection.

There is at least one issue I do not understand in this part, namely the meaning of the severity evaluation probability

P(d(Z) > d(z_0);\,\mu> \mu_1)

as the conditioning on the event seems impossible in a frequentist setting. This leads me to an idle and unrelated questioning as to whether there is a solution to

\sup_d \mathbb{P}_{H_0}(d(Z) \ge d(z_0))

as this would be the ultimate discrepancy. Or whether this does not make any sense… because of the ambiguous role of z0, which needs somehow to be integrated out. (Otherwise, d can be chosen so that the probability is 1.)

“If one renounces the likelihood, the stopping rule, and the coherence principles, marginalizes the use of prior information as largely untrustworthy, and seek procedures with `good’ error probabilistic properties (whatever that means), what is left to render the inference Bayesian, apart from a belief (misguided in my view) that the only way to provide an evidential account of inference is to attach probabilities to hypotheses?”—A. Spanos, p.326, Error and Inference, 2010

The role of conditioning ancillary statistics is emphasized both in the paper and the discussion. This conditioning clearly reduces variability, however there is no reservation about the arbitrariness of such ancillary statistics. And the fact that conditioning any further would lead to conditioning upon the whole data, i.e. to a Bayesian solution. I also noted a curious lack of proper logical reasoning in the argument that, when

f(z|\theta) \propto f(z|s) f(s|\theta),

using the conditional ancillary distribution is enough, since, while “any departure from f(z|s) implies that the overall model is false” (p.322), but not the reverse. Hence, a poor choice of s may fail to detect a departure. (Besides the fact that  fixed-dimension sufficient statistics do not exist outside exponential families.) Similarly, Spanos expands about the case of a minimal sufficient statistic that is independent from a maximal ancillary statistic, but such cases are quite rare and limited to exponential families [in the iid case]. Still in the conditioning category, he also supports Mayo’s argument against the likelihood principle being a consequence of the sufficiency and weak conditionality principles. A point I discussed in a previous post. However, he does not provide further evidence against Birnbaum’s result, arguing rather in favour of a conditional frequentist inference I have nothing to complain about. (I fail to perceive the appeal of the Welch uniform example in terms of the likelihood principle.)

In an overall conclusion, let me repeat and restate that this series of posts about Error and Inference is far from pretending at bringing a Bayesian reply to the philosophical arguments raised in the volume. The primary goal being of “taking some crucial steps towards legitimating the philosophy of frequentist statistics” (p.328), I should not feel overly concerned. It is only when the debate veered towards a comparison with the Bayesian approach [often too often of the "holier than thou" brand] that I felt allowed to put in my twopennies worth… I do hope I may crystallise this set of notes into a more constructed review of the book, if time allows, although I am pessimistic at the chances of getting it published given our current difficulties with the critical review of Murray Aitkin’s  Statistical Inference. However, as a coincidence, we got back last weekend an encouraging reply from Statistics and Risk Modelling, prompting us towards a revision and the prospect of a reply by Murray.


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