**O**f interest for xkcd fans: What If?: Serious Scientific Answers to Absurd Hypothetical Questions is out! Actually, it is currently the #1 bestseller on amazon! (A physics book makes it to the top of the bestseller list, a few weeks after a theoretical economics book got there. Nice! Actually, a statistics book also made it to the top: Nate Silver’s The SIgnal and the Noise….) I did not read the book, but it is made of some of the questions answered by Randall Munroe (the father of xkcd) on his what if blog. In connection with this publication, Randall Munroe is interviewed on FiveThirtyEight (Nate Silver’s website), as kindly pointed out to me by Bill Jefferys. The main message is trying to give people a feeling about numbers, a rough sense of numeracy. Which was also the purpose of the guesstimation books.

## Archive for xkcd

## xkcd [interview & book]

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics with tags Amazon, bestseller, book review, FiveThirtyEight, Guesstimation, Nate Silver, what if?, xkcd on September 14, 2014 by xi'an## editor’s nightmare

Posted in Books, Kids, pictures, University life with tags Fermat, Fermat's theorem, fonts, NIPS, proceedings, xkcd on June 24, 2014 by xi'an## a refutation of Johnson’s PNAS paper

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags Alice and Bob, Bayes factor, Bayesian statistics, Bayesian tests, hypothesis testing, p-value, Valen Johnson, xkcd on February 11, 2014 by xi'an**J**ean-Christophe Mourrat recently arXived a paper “P-value tests and publication bias as causes for high rate of non-reproducible scientific results?”, intended as a rebuttal of Val Johnson’s PNAS paper. The arguments therein are not particularly compelling. (Just as ours’ may sound so to the author.)

“We do not discuss the validity of this[Bayesian]hypothesis here, but we explain in the supplementary material that if taken seriously, it leads to incoherent results, and should thus be avoided for practical purposes.”

**T**he refutation is primarily argued as a rejection of the whole Bayesian perspective. (Although we argue Johnson’ perspective is not that Bayesian…) But the argument within the paper is much simpler: if the probability of rejection under the null is at most 5%, then the overall proportion of false positives is also at most 5% and not 20% as argued in Johnson…! Just as simple as this. Unfortunately, the author mixes conditional and unconditional, frequentist and Bayesian probability models. As well as conditioning upon the data and conditioning upon the rejection region… Read at your own risk. Continue reading