Archive for Bayes factor

model selection and multiple testing

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , on October 23, 2015 by xi'an

Ritabrata Dutta, Malgorzata Bogdan and Jayanta Ghosh recently arXived a survey paper on model selection and multiple testing. Which provides a good opportunity to reflect upon traditional Bayesian approaches to model choice. And potential alternatives. On my way back from Madrid, where I got a bit distracted when flying over the South-West French coast, from Biarritz to Bordeaux. Spotting the lake of Hourtain, where I spent my military training month, 29 years ago!

“On the basis of comparison of AIC and BIC, we suggest tentatively that model selection rules should be used for the purpose for which they were introduced. If they are used for other problems, a fresh justification is desirable. In one case, justification may take the form of a consistency theorem, in the other some sort of oracle inequality. Both may be hard to prove. Then one should have substantial numerical assessment over many different examples.”

The authors quickly replace the Bayes factor with BIC, because it is typically consistent. In the comparison between AIC and BIC they mention the connundrum of defining a prior on a nested model from the prior on the nesting model, a problem that has not been properly solved in my opinion. The above quote with its call to a large simulation study reminded me of the paper by Arnold & Loeppky about running such studies through ecdfs. That I did not see as solving the issue. The authors also discuss DIC and Lasso, without making much of a connection between those, or with the above. And then reach the parametric empirical Bayes approach to model selection exemplified by Ed George’s and Don Foster’s 2000 paper. Which achieves asymptotic optimality for posterior prediction loss (p.9). And which unifies a wide range of model selection approaches.

A second part of the survey considers the large p setting, where BIC is not a good approximation to the Bayes factor (when testing whether or not all mean entries are zero). And recalls that there are priors ensuring consistency for the Bayes factor in this very [restrictive] case. Then, in Section 4, the authors move to what they call “cross-validatory Bayes factors”, also known as partial Bayes factors and pseudo-Bayes factors, where the data is split to (a) make the improper prior proper and (b) run the comparison or test on the remaining data. They also show the surprising result that, provided the fraction of the data used to proper-ise the prior does not converge to one, the X validated Bayes factor remains consistent [for the special case above]. The last part of the paper concentrates on multiple testing but is more tentative and conjecturing about convergence results, centring on the differences between full Bayes and empirical Bayes. Then the plane landed in Paris and I stopped my reading, not feeling differently about the topic than when the plane started from Madrid.

Mathematical underpinnings of Analytics (theory and applications)

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 25, 2015 by xi'an

“Today, a week or two spent reading Jaynes’ book can be a life-changing experience.” (p.8)

I received this book by Peter Grindrod, Mathematical underpinnings of Analytics (theory and applications), from Oxford University Press, quite a while ago. (Not that long ago since the book got published in 2015.) As a book for review for CHANCE. And let it sit on my desk and in my travel bag for the same while as it was unclear to me that it was connected with Statistics and CHANCE. What is [are?!] analytics?! I did not find much of a definition of analytics when I at last opened the book, and even less mentions of statistics or machine-learning, but Wikipedia told me the following:

“Analytics is a multidimensional discipline. There is extensive use of mathematics and statistics, the use of descriptive techniques and predictive models to gain valuable knowledge from data—data analysis. The insights from data are used to recommend action or to guide decision making rooted in business context. Thus, analytics is not so much concerned with individual analyses or analysis steps, but with the entire methodology.”

Barring the absurdity of speaking of a “multidimensional discipline” [and even worse of linking with the mathematical notion of dimension!], this tells me analytics is a mix of data analysis and decision making. Hence relying on (some) statistics. Fine.

“Perhaps in ten years, time, the mathematics of behavioural analytics will be common place: every mathematics department will be doing some of it.”(p.10)

First, and to start with some positive words (!), a book that quotes both Friedrich Nietzsche and Patti Smith cannot get everything wrong! (Of course, including a most likely apocryphal quote from the now late Yogi Berra does not partake from this category!) Second, from a general perspective, I feel the book meanders its way through chapters towards a higher level of statistical consciousness, from graphs to clustering, to hidden Markov models, without precisely mentioning statistics or statistical model, while insisting very much upon Bayesian procedures and Bayesian thinking. Overall, I can relate to most items mentioned in Peter Grindrod’s book, but mostly by first reconstructing the notions behind. While I personally appreciate the distanced and often ironic tone of the book, reflecting upon the author’s experience in retail modelling, I am thus wondering at which audience Mathematical underpinnings of Analytics aims, for a practitioner would have a hard time jumping the gap between the concepts exposed therein and one’s practice, while a theoretician would require more formal and deeper entries on the topics broached by the book. I just doubt this entry will be enough to lead maths departments to adopt behavioural analytics as part of their curriculum… Continue reading

Bayesian model averaging in astrophysics

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , on July 29, 2015 by xi'an

[A 2013 post that somewhat got lost in a pile of postponed entries and referee’s reports…]

In this review paper, now published in Statistical Analysis and Data Mining 6, 3 (2013), David Parkinson and Andrew R. Liddle go over the (Bayesian) model selection and model averaging perspectives. Their argument in favour of model averaging is that model selection via Bayes factors may simply be too inconclusive to favour one model and only one model. While this is a correct perspective, this is about it for the theoretical background provided therein. The authors then move to the computational aspects and the first difficulty is their approximation (6) to the evidence

P(D|M) = E \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n L(\theta_i)Pr(\theta_i)\, ,

where they average the likelihood x prior terms over simulations from the posterior, which does not provide a valid (either unbiased or converging) approximation. They surprisingly fail to account for the huge statistical literature on evidence and Bayes factor approximation, incl. Chen, Shao and Ibrahim (2000). Which covers earlier developments like bridge sampling (Gelman and Meng, 1998).

As often the case in astrophysics, at least since 2007, the authors’ description of nested sampling drifts away from perceiving it as a regular Monte Carlo technique, with the same convergence speed n1/2 as other Monte Carlo techniques and the same dependence on dimension. It is certainly not the only simulation method where the produced “samples, as well as contributing to the evidence integral, can also be used as posterior samples.” The authors then move to “population Monte Carlo [which] is an adaptive form of importance sampling designed to give a good estimate of the evidence”, a particularly restrictive description of a generic adaptive importance sampling method (Cappé et al., 2004). The approximation of the evidence (9) based on PMC also seems invalid:

E \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \dfrac{L(\theta_i)}{q(\theta_i)}\, ,

is missing the prior in the numerator. (The switch from θ in Section 3.1 to X in Section 3.4 is  confusing.) Further, the sentence “PMC gives an unbiased estimator of the evidence in a very small number of such iterations” is misleading in that PMC is unbiased at each iteration. Reversible jump is not described at all (the supposedly higher efficiency of this algorithm is far from guaranteed when facing a small number of models, which is the case here, since the moves between models are governed by a random walk and the acceptance probabilities can be quite low).

The second quite unrelated part of the paper covers published applications in astrophysics. Unrelated because the three different methods exposed in the first part are not compared on the same dataset. Model averaging is obviously based on a computational device that explores the posteriors of the different models under comparison (or, rather, averaging), however no recommendation is found in the paper as to efficiently implement the averaging or anything of the kind. In conclusion, I thus find this review somehow anticlimactic.

inflation, evidence and falsifiability

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , on July 27, 2015 by xi'an

[Ewan Cameron pointed this paper to me and blogged about his impressions a few weeks ago. And then Peter Coles wrote a (properly) critical blog entry yesterday. Here are my quick impressions, as an add-on.]

“As the cosmological data continues to improve with its inevitable twists, it has become evident that whatever the observations turn out to be they will be lauded as \proof of inflation”.” G. Gubitosi et al.

In an arXive with the above title, Gubitosi et al. embark upon a generic and critical [and astrostatistical] evaluation of Bayesian evidence and the Bayesian paradigm. Perfect topic and material for another blog post!

“Part of the problem stems from the widespread use of the concept of Bayesian evidence and the Bayes factor (…) The limitations of the existing formalism emerge, however, as soon as we insist on falsifiability as a pre-requisite for a scientific theory (….) the concept is more suited to playing the lottery than to enforcing falsifiability: winning is more important than being predictive.” G. Gubitosi et al.

It is somehow quite hard not to quote most of the paper, because prose such as the above abounds. Now, compared with standards, the authors introduce an higher level than models, called paradigms, as collections of models. (I wonder what is the next level, monads? universes? paradises?) Each paradigm is associated with a marginal likelihood, obtained by integrating over models and model parameters. Which is also the evidence of or for the paradigm. And then, assuming a prior on the paradigms, one can compute the posterior over the paradigms… What is the novelty, then, that “forces” falsifiability upon Bayesian testing (or the reverse)?!

“However, science is not about playing the lottery and winning, but falsifiability instead, that is, about winning given that you have bore the full brunt of potential loss, by taking full chances of not winning a priori. This is not well incorporated into the Bayesian evidence because the framework is designed for other ends, those of model selection rather than paradigm evaluation.” G. Gubitosi et al.

The paper starts by a criticism of the Bayes factor in the point null test of a Gaussian mean, as overly penalising the null against the alternative being only a power law. Not much new there, it is well known that the Bayes factor does not converge at the same speed under the null and under the alternative… The first proposal of those authors is to consider the distribution of the marginal likelihood of the null model under the [or a] prior predictive encompassing both hypotheses or only the alternative [there is a lack of precision at this stage of the paper], in order to calibrate the observed value against the expected. What is the connection with falsifiability? The notion that, under the prior predictive, most of the mass is on very low values of the evidence, leading to concluding against the null. If replacing the null with the alternative marginal likelihood, its mass then becomes concentrated on the largest values of the evidence, which is translated as an unfalsifiable theory. In simpler terms, it means you can never prove a mean θ is different from zero. Not a tremendously item of news, all things considered…

“…we can measure the predictivity of a model (or paradigm) by examining the distribution of the Bayesian evidence assuming uniformly distributed data.” G. Gubitosi et al.

The alternative is to define a tail probability for the evidence, i.e. the probability to be below an arbitrarily set bound. What remains unclear to me in this notion is the definition of a prior on the data, as it seems to be model dependent, hence prohibits comparison between models since this would involve incompatible priors. The paper goes further into that direction by penalising models according to their predictability, P, as exp{-(1-P²)/P²}. And paradigms as well.

“(…) theoretical matters may end up being far more relevant than any probabilistic issues, of whatever nature. The fact that inflation is not an unavoidable part of any quantum gravity framework may prove to be its greatest undoing.” G. Gubitosi et al.

Establishing a principled way to weight models would certainly be a major step in the validation of posterior probabilities as a quantitative tool for Bayesian inference, as hinted at in my 1993 paper on the Lindley-Jeffreys paradox, but I do not see such a principle emerging from the paper. Not only because of the arbitrariness in constructing both the predictivity and the associated prior weight, but also because of the impossibility to define a joint predictive, that is a predictive across models, without including the weights of those models. This makes the prior probabilities appearing on “both sides” of the defining equation… (And I will not mention the issues of constructing a prior distribution of a Bayes factor that are related to Aitkin‘s integrated likelihood. And won’t obviously try to enter the cosmological debate about inflation.)

astronomical evidence

Posted in pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , on July 24, 2015 by xi'an

As I have a huge arXiv backlog and an even higher non-arXiv backlog, I cannot be certain I will find time to comment on those three recent and quite exciting postings connecting ABC with astro- and cosmo-statistics [thanks to Ewan for pointing out those to me!]:

Measuring statistical evidence using relative belief [book review]

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on July 22, 2015 by xi'an

“It is necessary to be vigilant to ensure that attempts to be mathematically general do not lead us to introduce absurdities into discussions of inference.” (p.8)

This new book by Michael Evans (Toronto) summarises his views on statistical evidence (expanded in a large number of papers), which are a quite unique mix of Bayesian  principles and less-Bayesian methodologies. I am quite glad I could receive a version of the book before it was published by CRC Press, thanks to Rob Carver (and Keith O’Rourke for warning me about it). [Warning: this is a rather long review and post, so readers may chose to opt out now!]

“The Bayes factor does not behave appropriately as a measure of belief, but it does behave appropriately as a measure of evidence.” (p.87)

Continue reading

Leave the Pima Indians alone!

Posted in Books, R, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on July 15, 2015 by xi'an

“…our findings shall lead to us be critical of certain current practices. Specifically, most papers seem content with comparing some new algorithm with Gibbs sampling, on a few small datasets, such as the well-known Pima Indians diabetes dataset (8 covariates). But we shall see that, for such datasets, approaches that are even more basic than Gibbs sampling are actually hard to beat. In other words, datasets considered in the literature may be too toy-like to be used as a relevant benchmark. On the other hand, if ones considers larger datasets (with say 100 covariates), then not so many approaches seem to remain competitive” (p.1)

Nicolas Chopin and James Ridgway (CREST, Paris) completed and arXived a paper they had “threatened” to publish for a while now, namely why using the Pima Indian R logistic or probit regression benchmark for checking a computational algorithm is not such a great idea! Given that I am definitely guilty of such a sin (in papers not reported in the survey), I was quite eager to read the reasons why! Beyond the debate on the worth of such a benchmark, the paper considers a wider perspective as to how Bayesian computation algorithms should be compared, including the murky waters of CPU time versus designer or programmer time. Which plays against most MCMC sampler.

As a first entry, Nicolas and James point out that the MAP can be derived by standard a Newton-Raphson algorithm when the prior is Gaussian, and even when the prior is Cauchy as it seems most datasets allow for Newton-Raphson convergence. As well as the Hessian. We actually took advantage of this property in our comparison of evidence approximations published in the Festschrift for Jim Berger. Where we also noticed the awesome performances of an importance sampler based on the Gaussian or Laplace approximation. The authors call this proposal their gold standard. Because they also find it hard to beat. They also pursue this approximation to its logical (?) end by proposing an evidence approximation based on the above and Chib’s formula. Two close approximations are provided by INLA for posterior marginals and by a Laplace-EM for a Cauchy prior. Unsurprisingly, the expectation-propagation (EP) approach is also implemented. What EP lacks in theoretical backup, it seems to recover in sheer precision (in the examples analysed in the paper). And unsurprisingly as well the paper includes a randomised quasi-Monte Carlo version of the Gaussian importance sampler. (The authors report that “the improvement brought by RQMC varies strongly across datasets” without elaborating for the reasons behind this variability. They also do not report the CPU time of the IS-QMC, maybe identical to the one for the regular importance sampling.) Maybe more surprising is the absence of a nested sampling version.

pimcisIn the Markov chain Monte Carlo solutions, Nicolas and James compare Gibbs, Metropolis-Hastings, Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, and NUTS. Plus a tempering SMC, All of which are outperformed by importance sampling for small enough datasets. But get back to competing grounds for large enough ones, since importance sampling then fails.

“…let’s all refrain from now on from using datasets and models that are too simple to serve as a reasonable benchmark.” (p.25)

This is a very nice survey on the theme of binary data (more than on the comparison of algorithms in that the authors do not really take into account design and complexity, but resort to MSEs versus CPus). I however do not agree with their overall message to leave the Pima Indians alone. Or at least not for the reason provided therein, namely that faster and more accurate approximations methods are available and cannot be beaten. Benchmarks always have the limitation of “what you get is what you see”, i.e., the output associated with a single dataset that only has that many idiosyncrasies. Plus, the closeness to a perfect normal posterior makes the logistic posterior too regular to pause a real challenge (even though MCMC algorithms are as usual slower than iid sampling). But having faster and more precise resolutions should on the opposite be  cause for cheers, as this provides a reference value, a golden standard, to check against. In a sense, for every Monte Carlo method, there is a much better answer, namely the exact value of the integral or of the optimum! And one is hardly aiming at a more precise inference for the benchmark itself: those Pima Indians [whose actual name is Akimel O’odham] with diabetes involved in the original study are definitely beyond help from statisticians and the model is unlikely to carry out to current populations. When the goal is to compare methods, as in our 2009 paper for Jim Berger’s 60th birthday, what matters is relative speed and relative ease of implementation (besides the obvious convergence to the proper target). In that sense bigger and larger is not always relevant. Unless one tackles really big or really large datasets, for which there is neither benchmark method nor reference value.


Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 946 other followers