Archive for Bayesian model choice

ABC on brain networks

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , on April 16, 2021 by xi'an

Research Gate sent me an automated email pointing out a recent paper citing some of our ABC papers. The paper is written by Timothy West et al., neuroscientists in the UK, comparing models of Parkinsonian circuit dynamics. Using SMC-ABC. One novelty is the update of the tolerance by a fixed difference, unless the acceptance rate is too low, in which case the tolerance is reinitialised to a starting value.

“(…) the proposal density P(θ|D⁰) is formed from the accepted parameters sets. We use a density approximation to the marginals and a copula for the joint (…) [i.e.] a nonparametric estimation of the marginal densities overeach parameter [and] the t-copula(…) Data are transformed to the copula scale (unit-square) using the kernel density estimator of the cumulative distribution function of each parameter and then transformed to the joint space with the t-copula.”

The construct of the proposal is quite involved, as described in the above quote. The model choice approach is standard (à la Grelaud et al.) but uses the median distance as a tolerance.

“(…) test whether the ABC estimator will: a) yield parameter estimates that are unique to the data from which they have been optimized; and b) yield consistent estimation of parameters across multiple instances (…) test the face validity of the model comparison framework (…) [and] demonstrate the scalability of the optimization and model comparison framework.”

The paper runs a fairly extensive test of the above features, concluding that “the ABC optimized posteriors are consistent across multiple initializations and that the output is determined by differences in the underlying model generating the given data.” Concerning model comparison, the authors mix the ABC Bayes factor with a post-hoc analysis of divergence to discriminate against overfitting. And mention the potential impact of the summary statistics in the conclusion section, albeit briefly, and the remark that the statistics were “sufficient to recover known parameters” is not supporting their use for model comparison. The additional criticism of sampling strategies for approximating Bayes factors is somewhat irrelevant, the main issue with ABC model choice being a change of magnitude in the evidence.

“ABC has established itself as a key tool for parameter estimation in systems biology (…) but is yet to see wide adoption in systems neuroscience. It is known that ABC will not perform well under certain conditions (Sunnåker et al., 2013). Specifically, it has been shown that the
simplest form of ABC algorithm based upon an rejection-sampling approach is inefficient in the case where the prior densities lie far from the true posterior (…) This motivates the use of neurobiologically grounded models over phenomenological models where often the ranges of potential parameter values are unknown.”

the new DIYABC-RF

Posted in Books, pictures, R, Statistics, Wines with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on April 15, 2021 by xi'an

My friends and co-authors from Montpellier have released last month the third version of the DIYABC software, DIYABC-RF, which includes and promotes the use of random forests for parameter inference and model selection, in connection with Louis Raynal’s thesis. Intended as the earlier versions of DIYABC for population genetic applications. Bienvenue!!!

The software DIYABC Random Forest (hereafter DIYABC-RF) v1.0 is composed of three parts: the dataset simulator, the Random Forest inference engine and the graphical user interface. The whole is packaged as a standalone and user-friendly graphical application named DIYABC-RF GUI and available at The different developer and user manuals for each component of the software are available on the same website. DIYABC-RF is a multithreaded software on three operating systems: GNU/Linux, Microsoft Windows and MacOS. One can use the program can be used through a modern and user-friendly graphical interface designed as an R shiny application (Chang et al. 2019). For a fluid and simplified user experience, this interface is available through a standalone application, which does not require installing R or any dependencies and hence can be used independently. The application is also implemented in an R package providing a standard shiny web application (with the same graphical interface) that can be run locally as any shiny application, or hosted as a web service to provide a DIYABC-RF server for multiple users.

a case for Bayesian deep learnin

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , on September 30, 2020 by xi'an

Andrew Wilson wrote a piece about Bayesian deep learning last winter. Which I just read. It starts with the (posterior) predictive distribution being the core of Bayesian model evaluation or of model (epistemic) uncertainty.

“On the other hand, a flat prior may have a major effect on marginalization.”

Interesting sentence, as, from my viewpoint, using a flat prior is a no-no when running model evaluation since the marginal likelihood (or evidence) is no longer a probability density. (Check Lindley-Jeffreys’ paradox in this tribune.) The author then goes for an argument in favour of a Bayesian approach to deep neural networks for the reason that data cannot be informative on every parameter in the network, which should then be integrated out wrt a prior. He also draws a parallel between deep ensemble learning, where random initialisations produce different fits, with posterior distributions, although the equivalent to the prior distribution in an optimisation exercise is somewhat vague.

“…we do not need samples from a posterior, or even a faithful approximation to the posterior. We need to evaluate the posterior in places that will make the greatest contributions to the [posterior predictive].”

The paper also contains an interesting point distinguishing between priors over parameters and priors over functions, ony the later mattering for prediction. Which must be structured enough to compensate for the lack of data information about most aspects of the functions. The paper further discusses uninformative priors (over the parameters) in the O’Bayes sense as a default way to select priors. It is however unclear to me how this discussion accounts for the problems met in high dimensions by standard uninformative solutions. More aggressively penalising priors may be needed, as those found in high dimension variable selection. As in e.g. the 10⁷ dimensional space mentioned in the paper. Interesting read all in all!

logic (not logistic!) regression

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , on February 12, 2020 by xi'an

A Bayesian Analysis paper by Aliaksandr Hubin, Geir Storvik, and Florian Frommlet on Bayesian logic regression was open for discussion. Here are some hasty notes I made during our group discussion in Paris Dauphine (and later turned into a discussion submitted to Bayesian Analysis):

“Originally logic regression was introduced together with likelihood based model selection, where simulated annealing served as a strategy to obtain one “best” model.”

Indeed, logic regression is not to be confused with logistic regression! Rejection of a true model in Bayesian model choice leads to Bayesian model choice and… apparently to Bayesian logic regression. The central object of interest is a generalised linear model based on a vector of binary covariates and using some if not all possible logical combinations (trees) of said covariates (leaves). The GLM is further using rather standard indicators to signify whether or not some trees are included in the regression (and hence the model). The prior modelling on the model indices sounds rather simple (simplistic?!) in that it is only function of the number of active trees, leading to an automated penalisation of larger trees and not accounting for a possible specificity of some covariates. For instance when dealing with imbalanced covariates (much more 1 than 0, say).

A first question is thus how much of a novel model this is when compared with say an analysis of variance since all covariates are dummy variables. Culling the number of trees away from the exponential of exponential number of possible covariates remains obscure but, without it, the model is nothing but variable selection in GLMs, except for “enjoying” a massive number of variables. Note that there could be a connection with variable length Markov chain models but it is not exploited there.

“…using Jeffrey’s prior for model selection has been widely criticized for not being consistent once the true model coincides with the null model.”

A second point that strongly puzzles me in the paper is its loose handling of improper priors. It is well-known that improper priors are at worst fishy in model choice settings and at best avoided altogether, to wit the Lindley-Jeffreys paradox and friends. Not only does the paper adopts the notion of a same, improper, prior on the GLM scale parameter, which is a position adopted in some of the Bayesian literature, but it also seems to be using an improper prior on each set of parameters (further undifferentiated between models). Because the priors operate on different (sub)sets of parameters, I think this jeopardises the later discourse on the posterior probabilities of the different models since they are not meaningful from a probabilistic viewpoint, with no joint distribution as a reference, neither marginal density. In some cases, p(y|M) may become infinite. Referring to a “simple Jeffrey’s” prior in this setting is therefore anything but simple as Jeffreys (1939) himself shied away from using improper priors on the parameter of interest. I find it surprising that this fundamental and well-known difficulty with improper priors in hypothesis testing is not even alluded to in the paper. Its core setting thus seems to be flawed. Now, the numerical comparison between Jeffrey’s [sic] prior and a regular g-prior exhibits close proximity and I thus wonder at the reason. Could it be that the culling and selection processes end up having the same number of variables and thus eliminate the impact of the prior? Or is it due to the recourse to a Laplace approximation of the marginal likelihood that completely escapes the lack of definition of the said marginal? Computing the normalising constant and repeating this computation while the algorithm is running ignores the central issue.

“…hereby, all states, including all possible models of maximum sized, will eventually be visited.”

Further, I found some confusion between principles and numerics. And as usual bemoan the acronym inflation with the appearance of a GMJMCMC! Where G stands for genetic (algorithm), MJ for mode jumping, and MCMC for…, well no surprise there! I was not aware of the mode jumping algorithm of Hubin and Storvik (2018), so cannot comment on the very starting point of the paper. A fundamental issue with Markov chains on discrete spaces is that the notion of neighbourhood becomes quite fishy and is highly dependent on the nature of the covariates. And the Markovian aspects are unclear because of the self-avoiding aspect of the algorithm. The novel algorithm is intricate and as such seems to require a superlative amount of calibration. Are all modes truly visited, really? (What are memetic algorithms?!)

back to Ockham’s razor

Posted in Statistics with tags , , , , , , , , , on July 31, 2019 by xi'an

“All in all, the Bayesian argument for selecting the MAP model as the single ‘best’ model is suggestive but not compelling.”

Last month, Jonty Rougier and Carey Priebe arXived a paper on Ockham’s factor, with a generalisation of a prior distribution acting as a regulariser, R(θ). Calling on the late David MacKay to argue that the evidence involves the correct penalising factor although they acknowledge that his central argument is not absolutely convincing, being based on a first-order Laplace approximation to the posterior distribution and hence “dubious”. The current approach stems from the candidate’s formula that is already at the core of Sid Chib’s method. The log evidence then decomposes as the sum of the maximum log-likelihood minus the log of the posterior-to-prior ratio at the MAP estimator. Called the flexibility.

“Defining model complexity as flexibility unifies the Bayesian and Frequentist justifications for selecting a single model by maximizing the evidence.”

While they bring forward rational arguments to consider this as a measure model complexity, it remains at an informal level in that other functions of this ratio could be used as well. This is especially hard to accept by non-Bayesians in that it (seriously) depends on the choice of the prior distribution, as all transforms of the evidence would. I am thus skeptical about the reception of the argument by frequentists…