Archive for brain imaging

Big Bayes goes South

Posted in Books, Mountains, pictures, Running, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on December 5, 2018 by xi'an

At the Big [Data] Bayes conference this week [which I found quite exciting despite a few last minute cancellations by speakers] there were a lot of clustering talks including the ones by Amy Herring (Duke), using a notion of centering that should soon appear on arXiv. By Peter Müller (UT, Austin) towards handling large datasets. Based on a predictive recursion that takes one value at a time, unsurprisingly similar to the update of Dirichlet process mixtures. (Inspired by a 1998 paper by Michael Newton and co-authors.) The recursion doubles in size at each observation, requiring culling of negligible components. Order matters? Links with Malsiner-Walli et al. (2017) mixtures of mixtures. Also talks by Antonio Lijoi and Igor Pruenster (Boconni Milano) on completely random measures that are used in creating clusters. And by Sylvia Frühwirth-Schnatter (WU Wien) on creating clusters for the Austrian labor market of the impact of company closure. And by Gregor Kastner (WU Wien) on multivariate factor stochastic models, with a video of a large covariance matrix evolving over time and catching economic crises. And by David Dunson (Duke) on distance clustering. Reflecting like myself on the definitely ill-defined nature of the [clustering] object. As the sample size increases, spurious clusters appear. (Which reminded me of a disagreement I had had with David McKay at an ICMS conference on mixtures twenty years ago.) Making me realise I missed the recent JASA paper by Miller and Dunson on that perspective.

Some further snapshots (with short comments visible by hovering on the picture) of a very high quality meeting [says one of the organisers!]. Following suggestions from several participants, it would be great to hold another meeting at CIRM in a near future. Continue reading

at the brain institute

Posted in Kids, pictures, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , on January 24, 2017 by xi'an

brainsFor a rather convoluted reason, I happened to visit the Brain and Spine Institute (ICM, Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle Épinière) yesterday, in Paris, within the Pitié-Salpétrière Hospital. And saw this row of brains, printed by 3D printers, rather than standing in jars. (Like Abe Normal’s.) Which produced brain shadows, not commonly seen otherwise!

machines learning but not teaching…

Posted in Books, pictures with tags , , , , , , , on October 28, 2016 by xi'an

A few weeks after the editorial “Algorithms and Blues“, Nature offers another (general public) entry on AIs and their impact on society, entitled “The Black Box of AI“. The call is less on open source AIs and more on accountability, namely the fact that decisions produced by AIS and impacting people one way or another should be accountable. Rather than excused by the way out “the computer said so”. What the article exposes is how (close to) impossible this is when the algorithms are based on black-box structures like neural networks and other deep-learning algorithms. While optimised to predict as accurately as possible one outcome given a vector of inputs, hence learning in that way how the inputs impact this output [in the same range of values], these methods do not learn in a more profound way in that they very rarely explain why the output occurs given the inputs. Hence, given a neural network that predicts go moves or operates a self-driving car, there is a priori no knowledge to be gathered from this network about the general rules of how humans play go or drive cars. This rather obvious feature means that algorithms that determine the severity of a sentence cannot be argued as being rational and hence should not be used per se (or that the judicial system exploiting them should be sued). The article is not particularly deep (learning), but it mentions a few machine-learning players like Pierre Baldi, Zoubin Ghahramani and Stéphane Mallat, who comments on the distance existing between those networks and true (and transparent) explanations. And on the fact that the human brain itself goes mostly unexplained. [I did not know I could include such dynamic images on WordPress!]

contemporary issues in hypothesis testing

Posted in Statistics with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 26, 2016 by xi'an

hipocontemptThis week [at Warwick], among other things, I attended the CRiSM workshop on hypothesis testing, giving the same talk as at ISBA last June. There was a most interesting and unusual talk by Nick Chater (from Warwick) about the psychological aspects of hypothesis testing, namely about the unnatural features of an hypothesis in everyday life, i.e., how far this formalism stands from human psychological functioning.  Or what we know about it. And then my Warwick colleague Tom Nichols explained how his recent work on permutation tests for fMRIs, published in PNAS, testing hypotheses on what should be null if real data and getting a high rate of false positives, got the medical imaging community all up in arms due to over-simplified reports in the media questioning the validity of 15 years of research on fMRI and the related 40,000 papers! For instance, some of the headings questioned the entire research in the area. Or transformed a software bug missing the boundary effects into a major flaw.  (See this podcast on Not So Standard Deviations for a thoughtful discussion on the issue.) One conclusion of this story is to be wary of assertions when submitting a hot story to journals with a substantial non-scientific readership! The afternoon talks were equally exciting, with Andrew explaining to us live from New York why he hates hypothesis testing and prefers model building. With the birthday model as an example. And David Draper gave an encompassing talk about the distinctions between inference and decision, proposing a Jaynes information criterion and illustrating it on Mendel‘s historical [and massaged!] pea dataset. The next morning, Jim Berger gave an overview on the frequentist properties of the Bayes factor, with in particular a novel [to me] upper bound on the Bayes factor associated with a p-value (Sellke, Bayarri and Berger, 2001)

B¹⁰(p) ≤ 1/-e p log p

with the specificity that B¹⁰(p) is not testing the original hypothesis [problem] but a substitute where the null is the hypothesis that p is uniformly distributed, versus a non-parametric alternative that p is more concentrated near zero. This reminded me of our PNAS paper on the impact of summary statistics upon Bayes factors. And of some forgotten reference studying Bayesian inference based solely on the p-value… It is too bad I had to rush back to Paris, as this made me miss the last talks of this fantastic workshop centred on maybe the most important aspect of statistics!