## Bayesian GANs [#2]

Posted in Books, pictures, R, Statistics with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , on June 27, 2018 by xi'an

As an illustration of the lack of convergence of the Gibbs sampler applied to the two “conditionals” defined in the Bayesian GANs paper discussed yesterday, I took the simplest possible example of a Normal mean generative model (one parameter) with a logistic discriminator (one parameter) and implemented the scheme (during an ISBA 2018 session). With flat priors on both parameters. And a Normal random walk as Metropolis-Hastings proposal. As expected, since there is no stationary distribution associated with the Markov chain, simulated chains do not exhibit a stationary pattern,

And they eventually reach an overflow error or a trapping state as the log-likelihood gets approximately to zero (red curve).

Too bad I missed the talk by Shakir Mohammed yesterday, being stuck on the Edinburgh by-pass at rush hour!, as I would have loved to hear his views about this rather essential issue…

## Bayesian gan [gan style]

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , on June 26, 2018 by xi'an

In their paper Bayesian GANS, arXived a year ago, Saatchi and Wilson consider a Bayesian version of generative adversarial networks, putting priors on both the model and the discriminator parameters. While the prospect seems somewhat remote from genuine statistical inference, if the following statement is representative

“GANs transform white noise through a deep neural network to generate candidate samples from a data distribution. A discriminator learns, in a supervised manner, how to tune its parameters so as to correctly classify whether a given sample has come from the generator or the true data distribution. Meanwhile, the generator updates its parameters so as to fool the discriminator. As long as the generator has sufficient capacity, it can approximate the cdf inverse-cdf composition required to sample from a data distribution of interest.”

I figure the concept can also apply to a standard statistical model, where x=G(z,θ) rephrases the distributional assumption x~F(x;θ) via a white noise z. This makes resorting to a prior distribution on θ more relevant in the sense of using potential prior information on θ (although the successes of probabilistic numerics show formal priors can be used on purely numerical ground).

The “posterior distribution” that is central to the notion of Bayesian GANs is however unorthodox in that the distribution is associated with the following conditional posteriors

where D(x,θ) is the “discriminator”, that is, in GAN lingo, the probability to be allocated to the “true” data generating mechanism rather than to the one associated with G(·,θ). The generative conditional posterior (1) then aims at fooling the discriminator, i.e. favours generative parameter values that raise the probability of wrong allocation of the pseudo-data. The discriminative conditional posterior (2) is a standard Bayesian posterior based on the original sample and the generated sample. The authors then iteratively sample from these posteriors, effectively implementing a two-stage Gibbs sampler.

“By iteratively sampling from (1) and (2) at every step of an epoch one can, in the limit, obtain samples from the approximate posteriors over [both sets of parameters].”

What worries me about this approach is that  just cannot work, in the sense that (1) and (2) cannot be compatible conditional (posterior) distributions. There is no joint distribution for which (1) and (2) would be the conditionals, since the pseudo-data appears in D for (1) and (1-D) in (2). This means that the convergence of a Gibbs sampler is at best to a stationary σ-finite measure. And hence that the meaning of the chain is delicate to ascertain… Am I missing any fundamental point?! [I checked the reviews on NIPS webpage and could not spot this issue being raised.]

## likelihood-free inference in high-dimensional models

Posted in Books, R, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , on September 1, 2015 by xi'an

“…for a general linear model (GLM), a single linear function is a sufficient statistic for each associated parameter…”

The recently arXived paper “Likelihood-free inference in high-dimensional models“, by Kousathanas et al. (July 2015), proposes an ABC resolution of the dimensionality curse [when the dimension of the parameter and of the corresponding summary statistics] by turning Gibbs-like and by using a component-by-component ABC-MCMC update that allows for low dimensional statistics. In the (rare) event there exists a conditional sufficient statistic for each component of the parameter vector, the approach is just as justified as when using a generic ABC-Gibbs method based on the whole data. Otherwise, that is, when using a non-sufficient estimator of the corresponding component (as, e.g., in a generalised [not general!] linear model), the approach is less coherent as there is no joint target associated with the Gibbs moves. One may therefore wonder at the convergence properties of the resulting algorithm. The only safe case [in dimension 2] is when one of the restricted conditionals does not depend on the other parameter. Note also that each Gibbs step a priori requires the simulation of a new pseudo-dataset, which may be a major imposition on computing time. And that setting the tolerance for each parameter is a delicate calibration issue because in principle the tolerance should depend on the other component values. Continue reading

## reflections on the probability space induced by moment conditions with implications for Bayesian Inference [refleXions]

Posted in Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , on November 26, 2014 by xi'an

“The main finding is that if the moment functions have one of the properties of a pivotal, then the assertion of a distribution on moment functions coupled with a proper prior does permit Bayesian inference. Without the semi-pivotal condition, the assertion of a distribution for moment functions either partially or completely specifies the prior.” (p.1)

Ron Gallant will present this paper at the Conference in honour of Christian Gouréroux held next week at Dauphine and I have been asked to discuss it. What follows is a collection of notes I made while reading the paper , rather than a coherent discussion, to come later. Hopefully prior to the conference.

The difficulty I have with the approach presented therein stands as much with the presentation as with the contents. I find it difficult to grasp the assumptions behind the model(s) and the motivations for only considering a moment and its distribution. Does it all come down to linking fiducial distributions with Bayesian approaches? In which case I am as usual sceptical about the ability to impose an arbitrary distribution on an arbitrary transform of the pair (x,θ), where x denotes the data. Rather than a genuine prior x likelihood construct. But I bet this is mostly linked with my lack of understanding of the notion of structural models.

“We are concerned with situations where the structural model does not imply exogeneity of θ, or one prefers not to rely on an assumption of exogeneity, or one cannot construct a likelihood at all due to the complexity of the model, or one does not trust the numerical approximations needed to construct a likelihood.” (p.4)

As often with econometrics papers, this notion of structural model sets me astray: does this mean any latent variable model or an incompletely defined model, and if so why is it incompletely defined? From a frequentist perspective anything random is not a parameter. The term exogeneity also hints at this notion of the parameter being not truly a parameter, but including latent variables and maybe random effects. Reading further (p.7) drives me to understand the structural model as defined by a moment condition, in the sense that

$\mathbb{E}[m(\mathbf{x},\theta)]=0$

has a unique solution in θ under the true model. However the focus then seems to make a major switch as Gallant considers the distribution of a pivotal quantity like

$Z=\sqrt{n} W(\mathbf{x},\theta)^{-\frac{1}{2}} m(\mathbf{x},\theta)$

as induced by the joint distribution on (x,θ), hence conversely inducing constraints on this joint, as well as an associated conditional. Which is something I have trouble understanding, First, where does this assumed distribution on Z stem from? And, second, exchanging randomness of terms in a random variable as if it was a linear equation is a pretty sure way to produce paradoxes and measure theoretic difficulties.

The purely mathematical problem itself is puzzling: if one knows the distribution of the transform Z=Z(X,Λ), what does that imply on the joint distribution of (X,Λ)? It seems unlikely this will induce a single prior and/or a single likelihood… It is actually more probable that the distribution one arbitrarily selects on m(x,θ) is incompatible with a joint on (x,θ), isn’t it?

“The usual computational method is MCMC (Markov chain Monte Carlo) for which the best known reference in econometrics is Chernozhukov and Hong (2003).” (p.6)

While I never heard of this reference before, it looks like a 50 page survey and may be sufficient for an introduction to MCMC methods for econometricians. What I do not get though is the connection between this reference to MCMC and the overall discussion of constructing priors (or not) out of fiducial distributions. The author also suggests using MCMC to produce the MAP estimate but this always stroke me as inefficient (unless one uses our SAME algorithm of course).

“One can also compute the marginal likelihood from the chain (Newton and Raftery (1994)), which is used for Bayesian model comparison.” (p.22)

Not the best solution to rely on harmonic means for marginal likelihoods…. Definitely not. While the author actually uses the stabilised version (15) of Newton and Raftery (1994) estimator, which in retrospect looks much like a bridge sampling estimator of sorts, it remains dangerously close to the original [harmonic mean solution] especially for a vague prior. And it only works when the likelihood is available in closed form.

“The MCMC chains were comprised of 100,000 draws well past the point where transients died off.” (p.22)

I wonder if the second statement (with a very nice image of those dying transients!) is intended as a consequence of the first one or independently.

“A common situation that requires consideration of the notions that follow is that deriving the likelihood from a structural model is analytically intractable and one cannot verify that the numerical approximations one would have to make to circumvent the intractability are sufficiently accurate.” (p.7)

This then is a completely different business, namely that defining a joint distribution by mean of moment equations prevents regular Bayesian inference because the likelihood is not available. This is more exciting because (i) there are alternative available! From ABC to INLA (maybe) to EP to variational Bayes (maybe). And beyond. In particular, the moment equations are strongly and even insistently suggesting that empirical likelihood techniques could be well-suited to this setting. And (ii) it is no longer a mathematical worry: there exist a joint distribution on m(x,θ), induced by a (or many) joint distribution on (x,θ). So the question of finding whether or not it induces a single proper prior on θ becomes relevant. But, if I want to use ABC, being given the distribution of m(x,θ) seems to mean I can only generate new values of this transform while missing a natural distance between observations and pseudo-observations. Still, I entertain lingering doubts that this is the meaning of the study. Where does the joint distribution come from..?!

“Typically C is coarse in the sense that it does not contain all the Borel sets (…)  The probability space cannot be used for Bayesian inference”

My understanding of that part is that defining a joint on m(x,θ) is not always enough to deduce a (unique) posterior on θ, which is fine and correct, but rather anticlimactic. This sounds to be what Gallant calls a “partial specification of the prior” (p.9).

Overall, after this linear read, I remain very much puzzled by the statistical (or Bayesian) implications of the paper . The fact that the moment conditions are central to the approach would once again induce me to check the properties of an alternative approach like empirical likelihood.

## an easy pun on conditional risk[cd]

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics with tags , , , , on September 22, 2013 by xi'an