Archive for Don Rubin

econometrics summer masterclass at Warwick, 15 May

Posted in pictures, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , on May 9, 2019 by xi'an

There is an Econometrics Summer Masterclass taking place in the department of economics next week in Warwick, on May 15, with Don Rubin as one of the speakers and the masterclass teacher.

severe testing : beyond Statistics wars?!

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on January 7, 2019 by xi'an

A timely start to my reading Deborah Mayo’s [properly printed] Statistical Inference as Severe Testing (How to get beyond the Statistics Wars) on the Armistice Day, as it seems to call for just this, an armistice! And the opportunity of a long flight to Oaxaca in addition… However, this was only the start and it took me several further weeks to peruse seriously enough the book (SIST) before writing the (light) comments below. (Receiving a free copy from CUP and then a second one directly from Deborah after I mentioned the severe sabotage!)

Indeed, I sort of expected a different content when taking the subtitle How to get beyond the Statistics Wars at face value. But on the opposite the book is actually very severely attacking anything not in the line of the Cox-Mayo severe testing line. Mostly Bayesian approach(es) to the issue! For instance, Jim Berger’s construct of his reconciliation between Fisher, Neyman, and Jeffreys is surgically deconstructed over five pages and exposed as a Bayesian ploy. Similarly, the warnings from Dennis Lindley and other Bayesians that the p-value attached with the Higgs boson experiment are not probabilities that the particle does not exist are met with ridicule. (Another go at Jim’s Objective Bayes credentials is found in the squared myth of objectivity chapter. Maybe more strongly than against staunch subjectivists like Jay Kadane. And yet another go when criticising the Berger and Sellke 1987 lower bound results. Which even extends to Vale Johnson’s UMP-type Bayesian tests.)

“Inference should provide posterior probabilities, final degrees of support, belief, probability (…) not provided by Bayes factors.” (p.443)

Another subtitle of the book could have been testing in Flatland given the limited scope of the models considered with one or at best two parameters and almost always a Normal setting. I have no idea whatsoever how the severity principle would apply in more complex models, with e.g. numerous nuisance parameters. By sticking to the simplest possible models, the book can carry on with the optimality concepts of the early days, like sufficiency (p.147) and and monotonicity and uniformly most powerful procedures, which only make sense in a tiny universe.

“The estimate is really a hypothesis about the value of the parameter.  The same data warrant the hypothesis constructed!” (p.92)

There is an entire section on the lack of difference between confidence intervals and the dual acceptance regions, although the lack of unicity in defining either of them should come as a bother. Especially outside Flatland. Actually the following section, from p.193 onward, reminds me of fiducial arguments, the more because Schweder and Hjort are cited there. (With a curve like Fig. 3.3. operating like a cdf on the parameter μ but no dominating measure!)

“The Fisher-Neyman dispute is pathological: there’s no disinterring the truth of the matter (…) Fisher grew to renounce performance goals he himself had held when it was found that fiducial solutions disagreed with them.”(p.390)

Similarly the chapter on the “myth of the “the myth of objectivity””(p.221) is mostly and predictably targeting Bayesian arguments. The dismissal of Frank Lad’s arguments for subjectivity ends up [or down] with a rather cheap that it “may actually reflect their inability to do the math” (p.228). [CoI: I once enjoyed a fantastic dinner cooked by Frank in Christchurch!] And the dismissal of loss function requirements in Ziliak and McCloskey is similarly terse, if reminding me of Aris Spanos’ own arguments against decision theory. (And the arguments about the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox as well.)

“It’s not clear how much of the current Bayesian revolution is obviously Bayesian.” (p.405)

The section (Tour IV) on model uncertainty (or against “all models are wrong”) is somewhat limited in that it is unclear what constitutes an adequate (if wrong) model. And calling for the CLT cavalry as backup (p.299) is not particularly convincing.

It is not that everything is controversial in SIST (!) and I found agreement in many (isolated) statements. Especially in the early chapters. Another interesting point made in the book is to question whether or not the likelihood principle at all makes sense within a testing setting. When two models (rather than a point null hypothesis) are X-examined, it is a rare occurrence that the likelihood factorises any further than the invariance by permutation of iid observations. Which reminded me of our earlier warning on the dangers of running ABC for model choice based on (model specific) sufficient statistics. Plus a nice sprinkling of historical anecdotes, esp. about Neyman’s life, from Poland, to Britain, to California, with some time in Paris to attend Borel’s and Lebesgue’s lectures. Which is used as a background for a play involving Bertrand, Borel, Neyman and (Egon) Pearson. Under the title “Les Miserables Citations” [pardon my French but it should be Les Misérables if Hugo is involved! Or maybe les gilets jaunes…] I also enjoyed the sections on reuniting Neyman-Pearson with Fisher, while appreciating that Deborah Mayo wants to stay away from the “minefields” of fiducial inference. With, mot interestingly, Neyman himself trying in 1956 to convince Fisher of the fallacy of the duality between frequentist and fiducial statements (p.390). Wisely quoting Nancy Reid at BFF4 stating the unclear state of affair on confidence distributions. And the final pages reawakened an impression I had at an earlier stage of the book, namely that the ABC interpretation on Bayesian inference in Rubin (1984) could come closer to Deborah Mayo’s quest for comparative inference (p.441) than she thinks, in that producing parameters producing pseudo-observations agreeing with the actual observations is an “ability to test accordance with a single model or hypothesis”.

“Although most Bayesians these days disavow classic subjective Bayesian foundations, even the most hard-nosed. “we’re not squishy” Bayesian retain the view that a prior distribution is an important if not the best way to bring in background information.” (p.413)

A special mention to Einstein’s cafe (p.156), which reminded me of this picture of Einstein’s relative Cafe I took while staying in Melbourne in 2016… (Not to be confused with the Markov bar in the same city.) And a fairly minor concern that I find myself quoted in the sections priors: a gallimaufry (!) and… Bad faith Bayesianism (!!), with the above qualification. Although I later reappear as a pragmatic Bayesian (p.428), although a priori as a counter-example!

truth or truthiness [book review]

Posted in Books, Kids, pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , on March 21, 2017 by xi'an

This 2016 book by Howard Wainer has been sitting (!) on my desk for quite a while and it took a long visit to Warwick to find a free spot to quickly read it and write my impressions. The subtitle is, as shown on the picture, “Distinguishing fact from fiction by learning to think like a data scientist”. With all due respect to the book, which illustrates quite pleasantly the dangers of (pseudo-)data mis- or over- (or eve under-)interpretation, and to the author, who has repeatedly emphasised those points in his books and tribunes opinion columns, including those in CHANCE, I do not think the book teaches how to think like a data scientist. In that an arbitrary neophyte reader would not manage to handle a realistic data centric situation without deeper training. But this collection of essays, some of which were tribunes, makes for a nice reading  nonetheless.

I presume that in this post-truth and alternative facts [dark] era, the notion of truthiness is familiar to most readers! It is often based on a misunderstanding or a misappropriation of data leading to dubious and unfounded conclusions. The book runs through dozens of examples (some of them quite short and mostly appealing to common sense) to show how this happens and to some extent how this can be countered. If not avoided as people will always try to bend, willingly or not, the data to their conclusion.

There are several parts and several themes in Truth or Truthiness, with different degrees of depth and novelty. The more involved part is in my opinion the one about causality, with illustrations in educational testing, psychology, and medical trials. (The illustration about fracking and the resulting impact on Oklahoma earthquakes should not be in the book, except that there exist officials publicly denying the facts. The same remark applies to the testing cheat controversy, which would be laughable had not someone ended up the victim!) The section on graphical representation and data communication is less exciting, presumably because it comes after Tufte’s books and message. I also feel the 1854 cholera map of John Snow is somewhat over-exploited, since he only drew the map after the epidemic declined.  The final chapter Don’t Try this at Home is quite anecdotal and at the same time this may the whole point, namely that in mundane questions thinking like a data scientist is feasible and leads to sometimes surprising conclusions!

“In the past a theory could get by on its beauty; in the modern world, a successful theory has to work for a living.” (p.40)

The book reads quite nicely, as a whole and a collection of pieces, from which class and talk illustrations can be borrowed. I like the “learned” tone of it, with plenty of citations and witticisms, some in Latin, Yiddish and even French. (Even though the later is somewhat inaccurate! Si ça avait pu se produire, ça avait dû se produire [p.152] would have sounded more vernacular in my Gallic opinion!) I thus enjoyed unreservedly Truth or Truthiness, for its rich style and critical message, all the more needed in the current times, and far from comparing it with a bag of potato chips as Andrew Gelman did, I would like to stress its classical tone, in the sense of being immersed in a broad and deep culture that seems to be receding fast.

Approximate Maximum Likelihood Estimation

Posted in Books, Mountains, pictures, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , on September 21, 2015 by xi'an

linz3Bertl et al. arXived last July a paper on a maximum likelihood estimator based on an alternative to ABC techniques. And to indirect inference. (One of the authors in et al. is Andreas Futschik whom I visited last year in Linz.) Paper that I only spotted when gathering references for a reading list on ABC… The method is related to the “original ABC paper” of Diggle and Gratton (1984) which, parallel to Rubin (1984), contains in retrospect the idea of ABC methods. The starting point is stochastic approximation, namely the optimisation of a function of a parameter θ when written as an expectation of a random variable Y, E[Y|θ], as in the Kiefer-Wolfowitz algorithm. However, in the case of the likelihood function, there is rarely an unbiased estimator and the authors propose instead to use a kernel density estimator of the density of the summary statistic. This means that, at each iteration of the Kiefer-Wolfowitz algorithm, two sets of observations and hence of summary statistics are simulated and two kernel density estimates derived, both to be applied to the observed summary. The sequences underlying the Kiefer-Wolfowitz algorithm are taken from (the excellent optimisation book of) Spall (2003). Along with on-the-go adaptation and convergence test.

The theoretical difficulty in this extension is however that the kernel density estimator is not unbiased and thus that, rigorously speaking, the validation of the Kiefer-Wolfowitz algorithm does not apply here. On the practical side, the need for multiple starting points and multiple simulations of pseudo-samples may induce considerable time overload. Especially if  bootstrap is used to evaluate the precision of the MLE approximation. Besides normal and M/G/1 queue examples, the authors illustrate the approach on a population genetic dataset of Borneo and Sumatra orang-utans. With 5 parameters and 28 summary statistics. Which thus means using a kernel density estimator in dimension 28, a rather perilous adventure..!

Statistics slides (5)

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , on December 7, 2014 by xi'an

La Défense from Paris-Dauphine, Nov. 15, 2012Here is the fifth and last set of slides for my third year statistics course, trying to introduce Bayesian statistics in the most natural way and hence starting with… Rasmus’ socks and ABC!!! This is an interesting experiment as I have no idea how my students will react. Either they will see the point besides the anecdotal story or they’ll miss it (being quite unhappy so far about the lack of mathematical rigour in my course and exercises…). We only have two weeks left so I am afraid the concept will not have time to seep through!

Statistics slides (4)

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , on November 10, 2014 by xi'an

La Défense from Paris-Dauphine, Nov. 15, 2012Here is the fourth set of slides for my third year statistics course, trying to build intuition about the likelihood surface and why on Earth would one want to find its maximum?!, through graphs. I am yet uncertain whether or not I will reach the point where I can teach more asymptotics so maybe I will also include asymptotic normality of the MLE under regularity conditions in this chapter…

Statistics slides (3)

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , on October 9, 2014 by xi'an

La Défense from Paris-Dauphine, Nov. 15, 2012Here is the third set of slides for my third year statistics course. Nothing out of the ordinary, but the opportunity to link statistics and simulation for students not yet exposed to Monte Carlo methods. (No ABC yet, but who knows?, I may use ABC as an entry to Bayesian statistics, following Don Rubin’s example! Surprising typo on the Project Euclid page for this 1984 paper, by the way…) On Monday, I had the pleasant surprise to see Shravan Vasishth in the audience, as he is visiting Université Denis Diderot (Paris 7) this month.