in defense of subjectivity [sound the gong]

When browsing the IMS Bulletin [01 October] a few days ago, I saw that Ruobin Gong (from Rutgers) had written a tribune about Subjectivism. In response to [IMS President] Krysz Burdzy’s presidential address at the IMS Meeting in London a few months earlier. Address that I had missed and where he was calling for the end of the term subjective in statistics… (While ironically attending the Bayesian conference in Montréal!) Given the tone of his Search for Certainty book, which Andrew and Larry and I discussed a while ago, I am not at all surprised by another go at Bayesian statistics, but I will not indulge into another response, since Krysz found my earlier review “venomous”! Especially since Ruobin has produced a deeply argument ed and academically grounded criticism of the presidential address (which, if I may mention it, sounds rather rambling away from statistics). In particular, Ruobin introduces Objectivity³ as “an interpreted characterization of the scientific object”, which reminds me of Nietzsche’s aphorism about physics. And where personal and collegial inputs are plusses, even though they could be qualified to be “subjective”. This was also Poincaré’s argument for Bayesian reasoning. In conclusion, I think that the London call to cease using the term in statistics was neither timely (as the subjective-versus-objective debate has sort of dried out) nor appropriate (in that it clashed with the views of part of the IMS community).

beyond subjective and objective in Statistics

“At the level of discourse, we would like to move beyond a subjective vs. objective shouting match.” (p.30)

This paper by Andrew Gelman and Christian Hennig calls for the abandonment of the terms objective and subjective in (not solely Bayesian) statistics. And argue that there is more than mere prior information and data to the construction of a statistical analysis. The paper is articulated as the authors’ proposal, followed by four application examples, then a survey of the philosophy of science perspectives on objectivity and subjectivity in statistics and other sciences, next to a study of the subjective and objective aspects of the mainstream statistical streams, concluding with a discussion on the implementation of the proposed move.

Rivers of London [book review]

Yet another book I grabbed on impulse while in Birmingham last month. And which had been waiting for me on a shelf of my office in Warwick. Another buy I do not regret! Rivers of London is delightful, as much for taking place in all corners of London as for the story itself. Not mentioning the highly enjoyable writing style!

“I though you were a sceptic, said Lesley. I though you were scientific”

The first volume in this detective+magic series, Rivers of London, sets the universe of this mix of traditional Metropolitan Police work and of urban magic, the title being about the deities of the rivers of London, including a Mother and a Father Thames… I usually dislike any story mixing modern life and fantasy but this is a definitive exception! What I enjoy in this book setting is primarily the language used in the book that is so uniquely English (to the point of having the U.S. edition edited!, if the author’s blog is to be believed). And the fact that it is so much about London, its history and inhabitants. But mostly about London, as an entity on its own. Even though my experience of London is limited to a few boroughs, there are many passages where I can relate to the location and this obviously makes the story much more appealing. The style is witty, ironic and full of understatements, a true pleasure.

“The tube is a good place for this sort of conceptual breakthrough because, unless you’ve got something to read, there’s bugger all else to do.”

The story itself is rather fun, with at least three levels of plots and two types of magic. It centres around two freshly hired London constables, one of them discovering magical abilities and been drafted to the supernatural section of the Metropolitan Police. And making all the monologues in the book. The supernatural section is made of a single Inspector, plus a few side characters, but with enough fancy details to give it life. In particular, Isaac Newton is credited with having started the section, called The Folly. Which is also the name of Ben Aaronovitch’s webpage.

“There was a poster (…) that said: `Keep Calm and Carry On’, which I thought was good advice.”

This quote is unvoluntarily funny in that it takes place in a cellar holding material from World War II. Except that the now invasive red and white poster was never distributed during the war… On the opposite it was pulped to save paper and the fact that a few copies survived is a sort of (minor) miracle. Hence a double anachronism in that it did not belong to a WWII room and that Peter Grant should have seen its modern avatars all over London.

“Have you ever been to London? Don’t worry, it’s basically  just like the country. Only with more people.”

The last part of the book is darker and feels less well-written, maybe simply because of the darker side and of the accumulation of events, while the central character gets rather too central and too much of an unexpected hero that saves the day. There is in particular a part where he seems to forget about his friend Lesley who is in deep trouble at the time and this does not seem to make much sense. But, except for this lapse (maybe due to my quick reading of the book over the week in Warwick), the flow and pace are great, with this constant undertone of satire and wit from the central character. I am definitely looking forward reading tomes 2 and 3 in the series (having already read tome 4 in Austria!, which was a mistake as there were spoilers about earlier volumes).

on noninformative priors

A few weeks ago, Larry Wasserman posted on Normal Deviate an entry on noninformative priors as a lost cause for statistics. I first reacted rather angrily to this post, then decided against posting my reply. After a relaxing week in Budapest, and the prospect of the incoming summer break, I went back to the post and edited it towards more constructive  goals… The post also got discussed by Andrew and Entsophy, generating in each case a heap of heated discussions. (Enjoy your summer, winter is coming!)

Although Larry wrote he wanted to restrain from only posting on Bayesian statistics, he does seem attracted to them like a moth to a candle… This time, it is about the “lost cause of noninformative priors”. While Larry is 200% entitled to post about whatever he likes or dislikes, the post does not really bring new fuel to the debate, if debate there is. First, I think everyone agrees that there is no such thing as a noninformative prior or a prior representing ignorance. (To quote from Jeffreys: “A prior probability used to express ignorance is merely the formal statement of ignorance” (ToP, VIII, x8.1). Every prior brings something into the game and this is reflected in the posterior inference. Sometimes, the impact is enormous and we may be unaware of it. Take for instance Bayesian nonparametrics. It is thus essential to keep this in mind. (And to keep calm!) Which does not mean we should not use them. Indeed, noninformative priors are a way of setting a reference measure, from which one can start evaluating the impact of picking this or that prior. Just a measure. (No-one gets emotional when hearing the Lebesgue measure mentioned, right?!) And if the reference prior is a σ-finite measure, one cannot even put a meaning to events like θ>0. This reference measure is required to set the Bayesian crank turning, here or there depending on one’s prior beliefs or information. If we reject those reference priors for accepting only the cases when the prior is provided along with the data and the model, I think everyone is a Bayesian. Even Feller. Even Larry (?).

Second, there is alas too much pathos or unintended meaning put in names like noninformative, ignorance, objective, &tc. And this may be the major message in Larry’s post. We should call those reference priors Linear A priors in reference to the mostly undeciphered Minoan alphabet. Or whatever name with no emotional content whatsoever in order not to drive people crazy. Noninformative is not even a word, to start with… And I dunno how to define ignorance in a mathematical manner.Once more in connection with the EMS 2013 meeting in Budapest, I do not see why one should object more to reference priors than to the so-called “subjective” priors, as the former provide a baseline against which to test the latter, using e.g. Xiao Li’s approach. I am actually much more annoyed by the use of a specific proper prior in a statistical analysis when this prior is neither justified nor assessed in terms of robustness. And I see nothing wrong in establishing either asymptotic or frequentist properties about some procedures connected with some of those reference priors: I became a Bayesian this way, after all.

Anyway, have a nice (end of the) summer if you are in the Northern Hemisphere, and expect delays (or snapshots!) on the ‘Og for the coming fortnight…