Archive for Laplace succession rule

from tramway to Panzer (or back!)…

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics with tags , , , , , , on June 14, 2019 by xi'an

Although it is usually presented as the tramway problem, namely estimating the number of tram or bus lines in a city given observing one line number, including The Bayesian Choice by yours truly, the original version of the problem is about German tanks, Panzer V tanks to be precise, which total number M was to be estimated by the Allies from their observation of serial numbers of a number k of tanks. The Riddler is restating the problem when the only available information is made of the smallest, 22, and largest, 144, numbers, with no information about the number k itself. I am unsure what the Riddler means by “best” estimate, but a posterior distribution on M (and k) can be certainly be constructed for a prior like 1/k x 1/M² on (k,M). (Using M² to make sure the posterior mean does exist.) The joint distribution of the order statistics is

\frac{k!}{(k-2)!} M^{-k} (144-22)^{k-2}\, \Bbb I_{2\le k\le M\ge 144}

which makes the computation of the posterior distribution rather straightforward. Here is the posterior surface (with an unfortunate rendering of an artefactual horizontal line at 237!), showing a concentration near the lower bound M=144. The posterior mode is actually achieved for M=144 and k=7, while the posterior means are (rounded as) M=169 and k=9.

a response by Ly, Verhagen, and Wagenmakers

Posted in Statistics with tags , , , , , , , , on March 9, 2017 by xi'an

Following my demise [of the Bayes factor], Alexander Ly, Josine Verhagen, and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers wrote a very detailed response. Which I just saw the other day while in Banff. (If not in Schiphol, which would have been more appropriate!)

“In this rejoinder we argue that Robert’s (2016) alternative view on testing has more in common with Jeffreys’s Bayes factor than he suggests, as they share the same ‘‘shortcomings’’.”

Rather unsurprisingly (!), the authors agree with my position on the dangers to ignore decisional aspects when using the Bayes factor. A point of dissension is the resolution of the Jeffreys[-Lindley-Bartlett] paradox. One consequence derived by Alexander and co-authors is that priors should change between testing and estimating. Because the parameters have a different meaning under the null and under the alternative, a point I agree with in that these parameters are indexed by the model [index!]. But with which I disagree when arguing that the same parameter (e.g., a mean under model M¹) should have two priors when moving from testing to estimation. To state that the priors within the marginal likelihoods “are not designed to yield posteriors that are good for estimation” (p.45) amounts to wishful thinking. I also do not find a strong justification within the paper or the response about choosing an improper prior on the nuisance parameter, e.g. σ, with the same constant. Another a posteriori validation in my opinion. However, I agree with the conclusion that the Jeffreys paradox prohibits the use of an improper prior on the parameter being tested (or of the test itself). A second point made by the authors is that Jeffreys’ Bayes factor is information consistent, which is correct but does not solved my quandary with the lack of precise calibration of the object, namely that alternatives abound in a non-informative situation.

“…the work by Kamary et al. (2014) impressively introduces an alternative view on testing, an algorithmic resolution, and a theoretical justification.”

The second part of the comments is highly supportive of our mixture approach and I obviously appreciate very much this support! Especially if we ever manage to turn the paper into a discussion paper! The authors also draw a connection with Harold Jeffreys’ distinction between testing and estimation, based upon Laplace’s succession rule. Unbearably slow succession law. Which is well-taken if somewhat specious since this is a testing framework where a single observation can send the Bayes factor to zero or +∞. (I further enjoyed the connection of the Poisson-versus-Negative Binomial test with Jeffreys’ call for common parameters. And the supportive comments on our recent mixture reparameterisation paper with Kaniav Kamari and Kate Lee.) The other point that the Bayes factor is more sensitive to the choice of the prior (beware the tails!) can be viewed as a plus for mixture estimation, as acknowledged there. (The final paragraph about the faster convergence of the weight α is not strongly

same data – different models – different answers

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , on June 1, 2016 by xi'an

An interesting question from a reader of the Bayesian Choice came out on X validated last week. It was about Laplace’s succession rule, which I found somewhat over-used, but it was nonetheless interesting because the question was about the discrepancy of the “non-informative” answers derived from two models applied to the data: an Hypergeometric distribution in the Bayesian Choice and a Binomial on Wikipedia. The originator of the question had trouble with the difference between those two “non-informative” answers as she or he believed that there was a single non-informative principle that should lead to a unique answer. This does not hold, even when following a reference prior principle like Jeffreys’ invariant rule or Jaynes’ maximum entropy tenets. For instance, the Jeffreys priors associated with a Binomial and a Negative Binomial distributions differ. And even less when considering that  there is no unity in reaching those reference priors. (Not even mentioning the issue of the reference dominating measure for the definition of the entropy.) This led to an informative debate, which is the point of X validated.

On a completely unrelated topic, the survey ship looking for the black boxes of the crashed EgyptAir plane is called the Laplace.

Mathematical underpinnings of Analytics (theory and applications)

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 25, 2015 by xi'an

“Today, a week or two spent reading Jaynes’ book can be a life-changing experience.” (p.8)

I received this book by Peter Grindrod, Mathematical underpinnings of Analytics (theory and applications), from Oxford University Press, quite a while ago. (Not that long ago since the book got published in 2015.) As a book for review for CHANCE. And let it sit on my desk and in my travel bag for the same while as it was unclear to me that it was connected with Statistics and CHANCE. What is [are?!] analytics?! I did not find much of a definition of analytics when I at last opened the book, and even less mentions of statistics or machine-learning, but Wikipedia told me the following:

“Analytics is a multidimensional discipline. There is extensive use of mathematics and statistics, the use of descriptive techniques and predictive models to gain valuable knowledge from data—data analysis. The insights from data are used to recommend action or to guide decision making rooted in business context. Thus, analytics is not so much concerned with individual analyses or analysis steps, but with the entire methodology.”

Barring the absurdity of speaking of a “multidimensional discipline” [and even worse of linking with the mathematical notion of dimension!], this tells me analytics is a mix of data analysis and decision making. Hence relying on (some) statistics. Fine.

“Perhaps in ten years, time, the mathematics of behavioural analytics will be common place: every mathematics department will be doing some of it.”(p.10)

First, and to start with some positive words (!), a book that quotes both Friedrich Nietzsche and Patti Smith cannot get everything wrong! (Of course, including a most likely apocryphal quote from the now late Yogi Berra does not partake from this category!) Second, from a general perspective, I feel the book meanders its way through chapters towards a higher level of statistical consciousness, from graphs to clustering, to hidden Markov models, without precisely mentioning statistics or statistical model, while insisting very much upon Bayesian procedures and Bayesian thinking. Overall, I can relate to most items mentioned in Peter Grindrod’s book, but mostly by first reconstructing the notions behind. While I personally appreciate the distanced and often ironic tone of the book, reflecting upon the author’s experience in retail modelling, I am thus wondering at which audience Mathematical underpinnings of Analytics aims, for a practitioner would have a hard time jumping the gap between the concepts exposed therein and one’s practice, while a theoretician would require more formal and deeper entries on the topics broached by the book. I just doubt this entry will be enough to lead maths departments to adopt behavioural analytics as part of their curriculum… Continue reading

an easy pun on conditional risk[cd]

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics with tags , , , , on September 22, 2013 by xi'an