variational approximation to empirical likelihood ABC

Sanjay Chaudhuri and his colleagues from Singapore arXived last year a paper on a novel version of empirical likelihood ABC that I hadn’t yet found time to read. This proposal connects with our own, published with Kerrie Mengersen and Pierre Pudlo in 2013 in PNAS. It is presented as an attempt at approximating the posterior distribution based on a vector of (summary) statistics, the variational approximation (or information projection) appearing in the construction of the sampling distribution of the observed summary. (Along with a weird eyed-g symbol! I checked inside the original LaTeX file and it happens to be a mathbbmtt g, that is, the typewriter version of a blackboard computer modern g…) Which writes as an entropic correction of the true posterior distribution (in Theorem 1).

“First, the true log-joint density of the observed summary, the summaries of the i.i.d. replicates and the parameter have to be estimated. Second, we need to estimate the expectation of the above log-joint density with respect to the distribution of the data generating process. Finally, the differential entropy of the data generating density needs to be estimated from the m replicates…”

The density of the observed summary is estimated by empirical likelihood, but I do not understand the reasoning behind the moment condition used in this empirical likelihood. Indeed the moment made of the difference between the observed summaries and the observed ones is zero iff the true value of the parameter is used in the simulation. I also fail to understand the connection with our SAME procedure (Doucet, Godsill & X, 2002), in that the empirical likelihood is based on a sample made of pairs (observed,generated) where the observed part is repeated m times, indeed, but not with the intent of approximating a marginal likelihood estimator… The notion of using the actual data instead of the true expectation (i.e. as a unbiased estimator) at the true parameter value is appealing as it avoids specifying the exact (or analytical) value of this expectation (as in our approach), but I am missing the justification for the extension to any parameter value. Unless one uses an ancillary statistic, which does not sound pertinent… The differential entropy is estimated by a Kozachenko-Leonenko estimator implying k-nearest neighbours.

“The proposed empirical likelihood estimates weights by matching the moments of g(X¹), …, g(X⁹) with that of
g(X⁰), without requiring a direct relationship with the parameter. (…) the constraints used in the construction of the empirical likelihood are based on the identity in (7), which can only be satisfied when θ = θ⁰. “

Although I am feeling like missing one argument, the later part of the paper seems to comfort my impression, as quoted above. Meaning that the approximation will fare well only in the vicinity of the true parameter. Which makes it untrustworthy for model choice purposes, I believe. (The paper uses the g-and-k benchmark without exploiting Pierre Jacob’s package that allows for exact MCMC implementation.)

Adrian Raftery’s course in Paris

UW Professor and U.S. National Academy of Sciences member Adrian Raftery has received the 2020 FSMP research chair and as a result will be visiting Paris this Fall 2021. He will be located at the MAP5 laboratory at the University of Paris. In particular, he will give a 20-hour Master course on statistical semography. This will be given over four successive Tuesdays, with 5 hours of lectures per week. The course is open to all. Attendance is free of charge but registration is mandatory. (To register, please fill the attached form. Lectures will be given in the salle du conseil, on the 7ft floor of the Saint-Germain-des-Prés campus, 45 rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 Paris.)

Demography aims to estimate and forecast population, fertility, mortality and migration. This is important for government policy-making, private sector planning, and research in the health and social sciences, and also critical for climate science and global health. It has traditionally been done using deterministic mathematical methods, but these ignore uncertainty and measurement error.  In the past decade, modern statistical methods were developed for this by our group at the University of Washington, and these were recently adopted by the  United Nations for their official population forecasts for all countries.  Statistical demography is expanding rapidly,  and this course will teach theory and practice of  methods and models of the field, with a focus on current and potential future research.

The topics will be:

1. Review of basic mathematical demographic methods.

2. Modeling age-specific rates, including model schedules and Lee-Carter method.

3. Statistical modeling and projection of fertility, mortality, migration and population.

4. Reconstructing population and vital rates from imperfect data.

frontier of simulation-based inference

“This paper results from the Arthur M. Sackler Colloquium of the National Academy of Sciences, `The Science of Deep Learning,’ held March 13–14, 2019, at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC.”

A paper by Kyle Cranmer, Johann Brehmer, and Gilles Louppe just appeared in PNAS on the frontier of simulation-based inference. Sounding more like a tribune than a research paper producing new input. Or at least like a review. Providing a quick introduction to simulators, inference, ABC. Stating the shortcomings of simulation-based inference as three-folded:

1. costly, since required a large number of simulated samples
2. loosing information through the use of insufficient summary statistics or poor non-parametric approximations of the sampling density.
3. wasteful as requiring new computational efforts for new datasets, primarily for ABC as learning the likelihood function (as a function of both the parameter θ and the data x) is only done once.

And the difficulties increase with the dimension of the data. While the points made above are correct, I want to note that ideally ABC (and Bayesian inference as a whole) only depends on a single dimension observation, which is the likelihood value. Or more practically that it only depends on the distance from the observed data to the simulated data. (Possibly the Wasserstein distance between the cdfs.) And that, somewhat unrealistically, that ABC could store the reference table once for all. Point 3 can also be debated in that the effort of learning an approximation can only be amortized when exactly the same model is re-employed with new data, which is likely in industrial applications but less in scientific investigations, I would think. About point 2, the paper misses part of the ABC literature on selecting summary statistics, e.g., the culling afforded by random forests ABC, or the earlier use of the score function in Martin et al. (2019).

The paper then makes a case for using machine-, active-, and deep-learning advances to overcome those blocks. Recouping other recent publications and talks (like Dennis on One World ABC’minar!). Once again presenting machine-learning techniques such as normalizing flows as more efficient than traditional non-parametric estimators. Of which I remain unconvinced without deeper arguments [than the repeated mention of powerful machine-learning techniques] on the convergence rates of these estimators (rather than extolling the super-powers of neural nets).

“A classifier is trained using supervised learning to discriminate two sets of data, although in this case both sets come from the simulator and are generated for different parameter points θ⁰ and θ¹. The classifier output function can be converted into an approximation of the likelihood ratio between θ⁰ and θ¹ (…) learning the likelihood or posterior is an unsupervised learning problem, whereas estimating the likelihood ratio through a classifier is an example of supervised learning and often a simpler task.”

The above comment is highly connected to the approach set by Geyer in 1994 and expanded in Gutmann and Hyvärinen in 2012. Interestingly, at least from my narrow statistician viewpoint!, the discussion about using these different types of approximation to the likelihood and hence to the resulting Bayesian inference never engages into a quantification of the approximation or even broaches upon the potential for inconsistent inference unlocked by using fake likelihoods. While insisting on the information loss brought by using summary statistics.

“Can the outcome be trusted in the presence of imperfections such as limited sample size, insufficient network capacity, or inefficient optimization?”

Interestingly [the more because the paper is classified as statistics] the above shows that the statistical question is set instead in terms of numerical error(s). With proposals to address it ranging from (unrealistic) parametric bootstrap to some forms of GANs.

mining gold [ABC in PNAS]

Johann Brehmer and co-authors have just published a paper in PNAS entitled “Mining gold from implicit models to improve likelihood-free inference”. (Besides the pun about mining gold, the paper also involves techniques named RASCAL and SCANDAL, respectively! For Ratio And SCore Approximate Likelihood ratio and SCore-Augmented Neural Density Approximates Likelihood.) This setup is not ABC per se in that their simulator is used both to generate training data and construct a tractable surrogate model. Exploiting Geyer’s (1994) classification trick of expressing the likelihood ratio as the optimal classification ratio when facing two equal-size samples from one density and the other.

“For all these inference strategies, the augmented data is particularly powerful for enhancing the power of simulation-based inference for small changes in the parameter θ.”

Brehmer et al. argue that “the most important novel contribution that differentiates our work from the existing methods is the observation that additional information can be extracted from the simulator, and the development of loss functions that allow us to use this “augmented” data to more efficiently learn surrogates for the likelihood function.” Rather than starting from a statistical model, they also seem to use a scientific simulator made of multiple layers of latent variables z, where

x=F⁰(u⁰,z¹,θ), z¹=G¹(u¹,z²), z²=G¹(u²,z³), …

although they also call the marginal of x, p(x|θ), an (intractable) likelihood.

“The integral of the log is not the log of the integral!”

The central notion behind the improvement is a form of Rao-Blackwellisation, exploiting the simulated z‘s. Joint score functions and joint likelihood ratios are then available. Ignoring biases, the authors demonstrate that the closest approximation to the joint likelihood ratio and the joint score function that only depends on x is the actual likelihood ratio and the actual score function, respectively. Which sounds like an older EM result, except that the roles of estimate and target quantity are somehow inverted: one is approximating the marginal with the joint, while the marginal is the “best” approximation of the joint. But in the implementation of the method, an estimate of the (observed and intractable) likelihood ratio is indeed produced towards minimising an empirical loss based on two simulated samples. Learning this estimate ê(x) then allows one to use it for the actual data. It however requires fitting a new ê(x) for each pair of parameters. Providing as well an estimator of the likelihood p(x|θ). (Hence the SCANDAL!!!) A second type of approximation of the likelihood starts from the approximate value of the likelihood p(x|θ⁰) at a fixed value θ⁰ and expands it locally as an exponential family shift, with the score t(x|θ⁰) as sufficient statistic.

I find the paper definitely interesting even though it requires the representation of the (true) likelihood as a marginalisation over multiple layers of latent variables z. And does not provide an evaluation of the error involved in the process when the model is misspecified. As a minor supplementary appeal of the paper, the use of an asymmetric Galton quincunx to illustrate an intractable array of latent variables will certainly induce me to exploit it in projects and courses!

[Disclaimer: I was not involved in the PNAS editorial process at any point!]

over-confident about mis-specified models?

Ziheng Yang and Tianqui Zhu published a paper in PNAS last year that criticises Bayesian posterior probabilities used in the comparison of models under misspecification as “overconfident”. The paper is written from a phylogeneticist point of view, rather than from a statistician’s perspective, as shown by the Editor in charge of the paper [although I thought that, after Steve Fienberg‘s intervention!, a statistician had to be involved in a submission relying on statistics!] a paper , but the analysis is rather problematic, at least seen through my own lenses… With no statistical novelty, apart from looking at the distribution of posterior probabilities in toy examples. The starting argument is that Bayesian model comparison is often reporting posterior probabilities in favour of a particular model that are close or even equal to 1.

“The Bayesian method is widely used to estimate species phylogenies using molecular sequence data. While it has long been noted to produce spuriously high posterior probabilities for trees or clades, the precise reasons for this over confidence are unknown. Here we characterize the behavior of Bayesian model selection when the compared models are misspecified and demonstrate that when the models are nearly equally wrong, the method exhibits unpleasant polarized behaviors,supporting one model with high confidence while rejecting others. This provides an explanation for the empirical observation of spuriously high posterior probabilities in molecular phylogenetics.”

The paper focus on the behaviour of posterior probabilities to strongly support a model against others when the sample size is large enough, “even when” all models are wrong, the argument being apparently that the correct output should be one of equal probability between models, or maybe a uniform distribution of these model probabilities over the probability simplex. Why should it be so?! The construction of the posterior probabilities is based on a meta-model that assumes the generating model to be part of a list of mutually exclusive models. It does not account for cases where “all models are wrong” or cases where “all models are right”. The reported probability is furthermore epistemic, in that it is relative to the measure defined by the prior modelling, not to a promise of a frequentist stabilisation in a ill-defined asymptotia. By which I mean that a 99.3% probability of model M¹ being “true”does not have a universal and objective meaning. (Moderation note: the high polarisation of posterior probabilities was instrumental in our investigation of model choice with ABC tools and in proposing instead error rates in ABC random forests.)

The notion that two models are equally wrong because they are both exactly at the same Kullback-Leibler distance from the generating process (when optimised over the parameter) is such a formal [or cartoonesque] notion that it does not make much sense. There is always one model that is slightly closer and eventually takes over. It is also bizarre that the argument does not account for the complexity of each model and the resulting (Occam’s razor) penalty. Even two models with a single parameter are not necessarily of intrinsic dimension one, as shown by DIC. And thus it is not a surprise if the posterior probability mostly favours one versus the other. In any case, an healthily sceptic approach to Bayesian model choice means looking at the behaviour of the procedure (Bayes factor, posterior probability, posterior predictive, mixture weight, &tc.) under various assumptions (model M¹, M², &tc.) to calibrate the numerical value, rather than taking it at face value. By which I do not mean a frequentist evaluation of this procedure. Actually, it is rather surprising that the authors of the PNAS paper do not jump on the case when the posterior probability of model M¹ say is uniformly distributed, since this would be a perfect setting when the posterior probability is a p-value. (This is also what happens to the bootstrapped version, see the last paragraph of the paper on p.1859, the year Darwin published his Origin of Species.)