Andrew & All about that Bayes!

Andrew Gelman is giving a talk on 11 October at 2 p.m. in Campus Pierre et Marie Curie (Sorbonne Université), room 16-26-209. He will talk about

Prior distribution for causal inference

In Bayesian inference, we must specify a model for the data (a likelihood) and a model for parameters (a prior). Consider two questions:

1. Why is it more complicated to specify the likelihood than the prior?
2. In order to specify the prior, how could can we switch between the theoretical literature (invariance, normality assumption, …) and the applied literature (experts elicitation, robustness, …)?

I will discuss those question in the domain of causal inference: prior distributions for causal effects, coefficients of regression and the other parameters in causal models.

robust inference using posterior bootstrap

The famous 1994 Read Paper by Michael Newton and Adrian Raftery was entitled Approximate Bayesian inference, where the boostrap aspect is in randomly (exponentially) weighting each observation in the iid sample through a power of the corresponding density, a proposal that happened at about the same time as Tony O’Hagan suggested the related fractional Bayes factor. (The paper may also be equally famous for suggesting the harmonic mean estimator of the evidence!, although it only appeared as an appendix to the paper.) What is unclear to me is the nature of the distribution g(θ) associated with the weighted bootstrap sample, conditional on the original sample, since the outcome is the result of a random Exponential sample and of an optimisation step. With no impact of the prior (which could have been used as a penalisation factor), corrected by Michael and Adrian via an importance step involving the estimation of g(·).

At the Algorithm Seminar today in Warwick, Emilie Pompe presented recent research, including some written jointly with Pierre Jacob, [which I have not yet read] that does exactly that inclusion of the log prior as penalisation factor, along with an extra weight different from one, as motivated by the possibility of a misspecification. Including a new approach to cut models. An alternative mentioned during the talk that reminds me of GANs is to generate a pseudo-sample from the prior predictive and add it to the original sample. (Some attendees commented on the dependence of the later version on the chosen parameterisation, which is an issue that had X’ed my mind as well.)

the many nuances of Bayesian testing [CERminar]

Metropolis-Hastings via Classification [One World ABC seminar]

Today, Veronika Rockova is giving a webinar on her paper with Tetsuya Kaji Metropolis-Hastings via classification. at the One World ABC seminar, at 11.30am UK time. (Which was also presented at the Oxford Stats seminar last Feb.) Please register if not already a member of the 1W ABC mailing list.

Fisher, Bayes, and predictive Bayesian inference [seminar]

An interesting Foundations of Probability seminar at Rutgers University this Monday, at 4:30ET, 8:30GMT, by Sandy Zabell (the password is Angelina’s birthdate):

R. A. Fisher is usually perceived to have been a staunch critic of the Bayesian approach to statistics, yet his last book (Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference, 1956) is much closer in spirit to the Bayesian approach than the frequentist theories of Neyman and Pearson.  This mismatch between perception and reality is best understood as an evolution in Fisher’s views over the course of his life.  In my talk I will discuss Fisher’s initial and harsh criticism of “inverse probability”, his subsequent advocacy of fiducial inference starting in 1930, and his admiration for Bayes expressed in his 1956 book.  Several of the examples Fisher discusses there are best understood when viewed against the backdrop of earlier controversies and antagonisms.