Archive for xkcd

eliminating an important obstacle to creative thinking: statistics…

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , on March 12, 2015 by xi'an

“We hope and anticipate that banning the NHSTP will have the effect of increasing the quality of submitted manuscripts by liberating authors from the stultified structure of NHSTP thinking thereby eliminating an important obstacle to creative thinking.”

About a month ago, David Trafimow and Michael Marks, the current editors of the journal Basic and Applied Social Psychology published an editorial banning all null hypothesis significance testing procedures (acronym-ed into the ugly NHSTP which sounds like a particularly nasty venereal disease!) from papers published by the journal. My first reaction was “Great! This will bring more substance to the papers by preventing significance fishing and undisclosed multiple testing! Power to the statisticians!” However, after reading the said editorial, I realised it was inspired by a nihilistic anti-statistical stance, backed by an apparent lack of understanding of the nature of statistical inference, rather than a call for saner and safer statistical practice. The editors most clearly state that inferential statistical procedures are no longer needed to publish in the journal, only “strong descriptive statistics”. Maybe to keep in tune with the “Basic” in the name of the journal!

“In the NHSTP, the problem is in traversing the distance from the probability of the finding, given the null hypothesis, to the probability of the null hypothesis, given the finding. Regarding confidence intervals, the problem is that, for example, a 95% confidence interval does not indicate that the parameter of interest has a 95% probability of being within the interval.”

The above quote could be a motivation for a Bayesian approach to the testing problem, a revolutionary stance for journal editors!, but it only illustrate that the editors wish for a procedure that would eliminate the uncertainty inherent to statistical inference, i.e., to decision making under… erm, uncertainty: “The state of the art remains uncertain.” To fail to separate significance from certainty is fairly appalling from an epistemological perspective and should be a case for impeachment, were any such thing to exist for a journal board. This means the editors cannot distinguish data from parameter and model from reality! Even more fundamentally, to bar statistical procedures from being used in a scientific study is nothing short of reactionary. While encouraging the inclusion of data is a step forward, restricting the validation or in-validation of hypotheses to gazing at descriptive statistics is many steps backward and does completely jeopardize the academic reputation of the journal, which editorial may end up being the last quoted paper. Is deconstruction now reaching psychology journals?! To quote from a critic of this approach, “Thus, the general weaknesses of the deconstructive enterprise become self-justifying. With such an approach I am indeed not sympathetic.” (Searle, 1983).

“The usual problem with Bayesian procedures is that they depend on some sort of Laplacian assumption to generate numbers where none exist (…) With respect to Bayesian procedures, we reserve the right to make case-by-case judgments, and thus Bayesian procedures are neither required nor banned from BASP.”

The section of Bayesian approaches is trying to be sympathetic to the Bayesian paradigm but again reflects upon the poor understanding of the authors. By “Laplacian assumption”, they mean Laplace´s Principle of Indifference, i.e., the use of uniform priors, which is not seriously considered as a sound principle since the mid-1930’s. Except maybe in recent papers of Trafimow. I also love the notion of “generat[ing] numbers when none exist”, as if the prior distribution had to be grounded in some physical reality! Although it is meaningless, it has some poetic value… (Plus, bringing Popper and Fisher to the rescue sounds like shooting Bayes himself in the foot.)  At least, the fact that the editors will consider Bayesian papers in a case-by-case basis indicate they may engage in a subjective Bayesian analysis of each paper rather than using an automated p-value against the 100% rejection bound!

[Note: this entry was suggested by Alexandra Schmidt, current ISBA President, towards an incoming column on this decision of Basic and Applied Social Psychology for the ISBA Bulletin.]

 

xkcd [interview & book]

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics with tags , , , , , , , on September 14, 2014 by xi'an

Of interest for xkcd fans: What If?: Serious Scientific Answers to Absurd Hypothetical Questions is out! Actually, it is currently the #1 bestseller on amazon! (A physics book makes it to the top of the bestseller list, a few weeks after a theoretical economics book got there. Nice! Actually, a statistics book also made it to the top: Nate Silver’s The SIgnal and the Noise….) I did not read the book, but it is made of some of the questions answered by Randall Munroe (the father of xkcd) on his what if blog. In connection with this publication, Randall Munroe is interviewed on FiveThirtyEight (Nate Silver’s website), as kindly pointed out to me by Bill Jefferys. The main message is trying to give people a feeling about numbers, a rough sense of numeracy. Which was also the purpose of the guesstimation books.

editor’s nightmare

Posted in Books, Kids, pictures, University life with tags , , , , , on June 24, 2014 by xi'an

a refutation of Johnson’s PNAS paper

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , on February 11, 2014 by xi'an

Jean-Christophe Mourrat recently arXived a paper “P-value tests and publication bias as causes for high rate of non-reproducible scientific results?”, intended as a rebuttal of Val Johnson’s PNAS paper. The arguments therein are not particularly compelling. (Just as ours’ may sound so to the author.)

“We do not discuss the validity of this [Bayesian] hypothesis here, but we explain in the supplementary material that if taken seriously, it leads to incoherent results, and should thus be avoided for practical purposes.”

The refutation is primarily argued as a rejection of the whole Bayesian perspective. (Although we argue Johnson’ perspective is not that Bayesian…) But the argument within the paper is much simpler: if the probability of rejection under the null is at most 5%, then the overall proportion of false positives is also at most 5% and not 20% as argued in Johnson…! Just as simple as this. Unfortunately, the author mixes conditional and unconditional, frequentist and Bayesian probability models. As well as conditioning upon the data and conditioning upon the rejection region… Read at your own risk. Continue reading

an easy pun on conditional risk[cd]

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics with tags , , , , on September 22, 2013 by xi'an

the original xkcd entry on Bayes [with its mistake]

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics with tags , on July 13, 2013 by xi'an

Bayes is back on xkcd

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics with tags , , , on July 12, 2013 by xi'an

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