Archive for Bayesian nonparametrics

ABC webinar, first!

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , on April 13, 2020 by xi'an

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The première of the ABC World Seminar last Thursday was most successful! It took place at the scheduled time, with no technical interruption and allowed 130⁺ participants from most of the World [sorry, West Coast friends!] to listen to the first speaker, Dennis Prangle,  presenting normalising flows and distilled importance sampling. And to answer questions. As I had already commented on the earlier version of his paper, I will not reproduce them here. In short, I remain uncertain, albeit not skeptical, about the notions of normalising flows and variational encoders for estimating densities, when perceived as a non-parametric estimator due to the large number of parameters it involves and wonder at the availability of convergence rates. Incidentally, I had forgotten at the remarkable link between KL distance & importance sampling variability. Adding to the to-read list Müller et al. (2018) on neural importance sampling.

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Judith’s colloquium at Warwick

Posted in Statistics with tags , , , , , , , , on February 21, 2020 by xi'an

BayesComp 2020 at a glance

Posted in Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on December 18, 2019 by xi'an

Bayesian probabilistic numerical methods

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , on December 5, 2019 by xi'an

“…in isolation, the error of a numerical method can often be studied and understood, but when composed into a pipeline the resulting error structure maybe non-trivial and its analysis becomes more difficult. The real power of probabilistic numerics lies in its application to pipelines of numerical methods, where the probabilistic formulation permits analysis of variance (ANOVA) to understand the contribution of each discretisation to the overall numerical error.”

Jon Cockayne (Warwick), Chris Oates (formerly Warwick), T.J. Sullivan, and Mark Girolami (formerly Warwick) got their survey on Bayesian probabilistic numerical methods in the SIAM (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics) Review, which is quite a feat given the non-statistical flavour of the journal (although Art Owen is now one of the editors of the review). As already reported in some posts on the ‘Og, the concept relies on the construction of a prior measure over a set of potential solutions, and numerical methods are assessed against the associated posterior measure. Not only is this framework more compelling in a conceptual sense, but it also leads to novel probabilistic numerical methods managing to solve quite challenging numerical tasks. Congrats to the authors!

noninformative Bayesian prior with a finite support

Posted in Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , on December 4, 2018 by xi'an

A few days ago, Pierre Jacob pointed me to a PNAS paper published earlier this year on a form of noninformative Bayesian analysis by Henri Mattingly and coauthors. They consider a prior that “maximizes the mutual information between parameters and predictions”, which sounds very much like José Bernardo’s notion of reference priors. With the rather strange twist of having the prior depending on the data size m even they work under an iid assumption. Here information is defined as the difference between the entropy of the prior and the conditional entropy which is not precisely defined in the paper but looks like the expected [in the data x] Kullback-Leibler divergence between prior and posterior. (I have general issues with the paper in that I often find it hard to read for a lack of precision and of definition of the main notions.)

One highly specific (and puzzling to me) feature of the proposed priors is that they are supported by a finite number of atoms, which reminds me very much of the (minimax) least favourable priors over compact parameter spaces, as for instance in the iconic paper by Casella and Strawderman (1984). For the same mathematical reason that non-constant analytic functions must have separated maxima. This is conducted under the assumption and restriction of a compact parameter space, which must be chosen in most cases. somewhat arbitrarily and not without consequences. I can somehow relate to the notion that a finite support prior translates the limited precision in the estimation brought by a finite sample. In other words, given a sample size of m, there is a maximal precision one can hope for, producing further decimals being silly. Still, the fact that the support of the prior is fixed a priori, completely independently of the data, is both unavoidable (for the prior to be prior!) and very dependent on the choice of the compact set. I would certainly prefer to see a maximal degree of precision expressed a posteriori, meaning that the support would then depend on the data. And handling finite support posteriors is rather awkward in that many notions like confidence intervals do not make much sense in that setup. (Similarly, one could argue that Bayesian non-parametric procedures lead to estimates with a finite number of support points but these are determined based on the data, not a priori.)

Interestingly, the derivation of the “optimal” prior is operated by iterations where the next prior is the renormalised version of the current prior times the exponentiated Kullback-Leibler divergence, which is “guaranteed to converge to the global maximum” for a discretised parameter space. The authors acknowledge that the resolution is poorly suited to multidimensional settings and hence to complex models, and indeed the paper only covers a few toy examples of moderate and even humble dimensions.

Another difficulty with the paper is the absence of temporal consistency: since the prior depends on the sample size, the posterior for n i.i.d. observations is no longer the prior for the (n+1)th observation.

“Because it weights the irrelevant parameter volume, the Jeffreys prior has strong dependence on microscopic effects invisible to experiment”

I simply do not understand the above sentence that apparently counts as a criticism of Jeffreys (1939). And would appreciate anyone enlightening me! The paper goes into comparing priors through Bayes factors, which ignores the main difficulty of an automated solution such as Jeffreys priors in its inability to handle infinite parameter spaces by being almost invariably improper.